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CHAPTER 9 
Labor and Employment Law 
NELSON G. ROSS* 
MARK V. NUCCIO** 
§ 9.1. Introduction. During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court dealt with a variety of issues 
relating to labor and employment law. The topics covered by these deci-
sions include the following: a public employer's obligation to bargain over 
mid-contract changes; the ability of a public employer to implement its 
last offer after an impasse in bargaining is reached; the arbitrability of 
issues which arise out of an expired collective bargaining agreement; the 
right of striking employees to be reinstated after engaging in an unlawful 
strike; the scope of exclusive managerial prerogatives; the authority ofthe 
Labor Relations Commission to order back pay in unlawful discharge 
cases; interpretations of the teacher tenure statute; reductions in teacher 
salaries; the power of a school committee to suspend a teacher; the right 
of housing authorities to condition signing of collective bargaining agree-
ments; the power of the Labor Relations Commission to award attorney's 
fees and expenses; judicial review of dismissals of tenured teachers; and 
interpretations of the employment security statute. 
§ 9.2. Public Employer- Obligations Concerning Mid-Contract Changes 
-Mandatory Subject of Bargaining. During the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court addressed a number of important issues in School Commit-
tee of Newton v. Labor Relations Commission. 1 These issues included 
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the obligation of a public employer to 
bargain about mid-contract changes and the manner in which that obliga-
tion must be discharged, the standards for determining whether there has 
been a waiver of the right to bargain, and the principles that govern 
eligibility for and determination of back pay. 
In February, 1976, a representative of the Newton School Committee 
(the "School Committee") told representatives of the Newton School 
Custodians Association (the" Association") that a reduction in force was 
* NELSON G. ROSS is a partner in the Boston law firm of Ropes and Gray. 
** MARK V. NUCCIO is Budget Director of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives. 
§ 9.2. 1 388 Mass. 557, 447 N.E.2d 1201 (1983). 
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possible. 2 In response, the president of the Association wrote to the 
School Committee's assistant director of personnel stating that he hoped 
any reduction in force would be handled through attrition.3 A collective 
bargaining agreement was in effect at the time. 4 During negotiations for 
the agreement, neither the School Committee nor the Association had 
offered proposals concerning layoffs or reductions in force; nor had the 
School Committee given the Association notice that a reduction in force 
was planned.5 After "some inconclusive general discussion at regular 
meetings" between Association representatives and the director of sup-
port services, layoff notices were issued to seven custodians in April, 
1976, to be effective on June 30 of that year.6 The seven custodians, 
though provisional, were senior in length of service to at least seven other 
provisional custodians to be retained. 7 Although there was discussion 
between the Association and the School Committee about the reduction in 
force, the layoffs took effect on June 30 as planned.8 
Following hearings on prohibited practice charges filed by the Associa-
tion,9 the Labor Relations Commission (the "Commission") found that a 
violation of chapter 150E, section 10(a)(l) and (5) had been committed and 
ordered the School Committee to reinstate the custodians with back pay 
and interest from the date of layoff to the date of the respective offers of 
reinstatement. 10 Subsequently, back pay hearings were held and the 
Commission ordered the payment of specific amounts to six of the seven 
custodians.U The School Committee appealed both the Commission's 
ruling that it had engaged in a prohibited practice and the back pay 
award. 12 The Association also appealed certain aspects of the back pay 
awardY Agreeing with the Commission's conclusions, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court affirmed the judgment and decision. 14 
The first issue addressed by the Court was the School Committee's 
obligations to bargain over its decision to reduce forces by layoff and over 
the impact of that decision. All parties agreed that the decision to reduce 
forces was a matter within the School Committee's exclusive managerial 
2 Id. at 560, 447 N.E.2d at 1205. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on December 15, 1975, and 





9 Id. at 560, 447 N.E.2d at 1204. 
10 ld. at 560 n.3, 447 N.E.2d at 1205 n.3. 
11 ld. at 561 n.3, 447 N.E.2d at 1205 n.3. 
12 Jd. at 559, 447 N.E.2d at 1204. 
13 ld. 
14 Jd. at 559, 447 N.E.2d at 1204-1205. 
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prerogative. 15 The points upon which they disagreed were whether there 
was an obligation to bargain over how the reduction would be accom-
plished (i.e., by layoff) and, if so, whether there was an obligation to 
bargain over the impact of the layoff. 16 
The Court stated that, although lower courts had rendered decisions on 
proper subjects of bargaining, this was the first case in which the Court 
had been called upon to decide whether a subject was a mandatory subject 
of collective bargaining. 17 The Court concluded that termination of em-
ployment by layoff is a "term or condition," within the meaning of 
chapter 150E, section 6,18 which goes to the "very essence" of the 
employment relationship, and therefore, falls literally within the scope of 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. 19 
The fundamental issue for the Court was "whether general grants of 
discretion to a school committee to layoff employees take precedence 
over the duty [to bargain] stated in [section] 6."20 The School Committee 
relied upon statutory grants and provisions of the Newton city charter as 
the basis for its position that the matter of layoffs cannot be subject to any 
contrary provision in a contract. 21 The only mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, the School Committee contended, are those dealt with in the 
regulations and statutes listed in chapter 150E, section 7(d), which may be 
superseded by a collective bargaining provision. 22 To support its position 
concerning statutory grants, the School Committee cited the general 
grants of authority to school committees to operate and manage public 
schools found in chapter 71, sections 37 and 68. 23 The Court, however, 
saw no aspect of educational policy implicated in a requirement to bargain 
over a decision to reduce forces by layoff or over the impact of such a 
layoff. 24 
The School Committee also argued that the city charter grants of 
authority to discharge employees "at its pleasure" controlled because 
these grants are not listed in chapter 150E, section 7(d), as capable of 
15 /d. at 562, 447 N.E.2d at 1206. 
16 !d. 
17 !d. 
18 G.L. c. 150E, § 6 provides: 
The employer and the exclusive representative shall meet at reasonable times, includ-
ing meetings in advance of the employer's budget-making process and shall negotiate 
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards of productivity and perfor-
mance, and any other terms and conditions of employment, but such obligation shall 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or make a concession. 
19 388 Mass. at 563, 447 N.E.2d at 1206. 
20 !d. at 564, 447 N.E.2d at 1207. 
21 /d. at 564-65, 447 N.E.2d at 1207. 
"/d. at 565, 447 N.E.2d at 1207. 
23 /d. at 565, 447 N.E.2d at 1208. 
24 /d. 
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being superseded by a collective bargaining agreement. 25 The Court dis-
missed this contention, noting that few of the statutes and regulations 
listed in section 7 apply to school committees.26 In the Court's view, 
accepting the School Committee's argument would mean that it "had 
virtually no obligation to bargain about anything. " 27 The Court further 
stated: 
We do not attribute to the Legislature an intention to pass a largely ineffec-
tive collective bargaining statute as to public school employees. The general 
discretion to act which school committees have is limited by their obligation 
to bargain stated in [chapter] 150E, [section] 6. A school committee need 
not bargain concerning specific statutory requirements or limitations not 
listed in [section] 7(d). The fact that [section] 7(d) does not list the general 
authority of school committees to discharge employees at their pleasure is 
irrelevant in the face of the legislative purpose to subject that general 
authority to the collective bargaining process, absent some overriding pol-
icy against interfering with the school committee's right to determine sig-
nificant aspects of educational policy. 28 
It follows, the Court said, that decisions regarding the timing of any 
layoff, the number of employees to be laid off, and which employees are 
to be laid off are also required subjects of bargaining.29 
Turning to the second issue, the Court considered the obligation to 
bargain over a layoff which occurs mid-contract and changes no existing 
practice. The School Committee argued that, under the circumstances of 
this case, it was under no obligation to bargain because the collective 
bargaining agreement was in midterm and the issue of layoffs had not been 
discussed in bargaining. 
Rejecting this argument, the Court concluded that a school committee 
is obligated to bargain over mandatory subjects that are not covered in a 
collective bargaining agreement and that are not discussed in bargaining, 30 
provided there has not been a waiver by the union of the right to bargain. 
The Court found unpersuasive the School Committee's contentions that 
"the commission ignored its own precedent in imposing a mid-term duty 
to bargain where there was no existing practice" and that it was "unfair to 
place a new requirement on the school committee because it relied on that 
precedent in good faith. " 31 The Commission's decision, the Court stated, 
was anticipated both by the Commission's own decisions32 and decisions 




29 !d. at 566-67, 447 N.E.2d at 1208. 
30 !d. at 567, 447 N.E.2d at 1209. 
31 !d. 
32 !d. at 567-68, 447 N.E.2d at 1209 (citing Cohasset School Comm., No. MUP-419 
(1974)). 
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under the National Labor Relations Act. 33 
The Court also rejected the School Committee's contention that the 
Association had waived its right to bargain. The Court concurred with the 
Commission's conclusions that the broad but general management rights 
clause,34 which made no reference to layoffs, did not constitute a waiver 
and that a waiver to be effective must be clear, unmistakable and un-
equivocal. 35 Agreeing with the Commission, the Court noted that the 
Association had not waived its right to bargain by inaction. 36 In the 
Court's view, the Association did not have sufficient specific information 
upon which it should have been expected to act. 37 
The Court next considered whether the School Committee had fulfilled 
its obligation to bargain. The Commission had found that the Association 
immediately sought to have input into the layoff decision when, on Feb-
ruary 15, 1976, it was informed that layoffs were likely. From that time 
until layoff notices were issued, according to the Commission, the School 
Committee failed to make itself available for bargaining, thus violating 
chapter 150E, section 10(a)(5), regardless of its good or bad faith. 38 The 
33 School Comm. of Newton, 388 Mass. at 568, 447 N.E.2d at 1209 (citing NL Indus. v. 
NLRB, 536 F.2d 786, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1976); Robert Shaw Controls Co., Aero Div. v. 
NLRB, 386 F.2d 377, 388-89 (4th Cir .. 1967); NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 683-84 
(2d Cir. 1952)). 
34 388 Mass. at 568 n.7, 447 N.E.2d at 1210 n.7. The management rights clause stated: 
Except as specifically abridged, delegated, granted or modified by this Agreement, or 
any supplementary agreements that may hereafter be made, all of the rights, powers 
and authority the EMPLOYER had prior to the signing of this Agreement are retained 
by the EMPLOYER, and remain exclusively and without limitation within the rights 
of management. 
/d. 
35 Id. at 568,447 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing NLRB v. Everbrite Elec. Signs Inc., 562 F.2d 405, 
407-08 (7th Cir. 1977); Leeds & Northrop Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874, 877-78 (3d Cir. 1%8); 
City of Boston, 9 M.L.C. 1173, 1175 (H. 0. 1982); Town of Andover, 3 M.L.C. 1710, 1717 
(H. 0. 1977); City of Everett, 2 M.L.C. 1471, 1475-76 (1976), aff'd, Labor Relations 
Comm'n v. Everett, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 826 (1979)). The Court also noted that a "zipper" 
clause ("a provision making the contract the exclusive statement of the parties' rights"), 
may support a finding of waiver, but that no zipper clause was found in School Comm. of 
Newton, 388 Mass. at 569 n.8, 447 N.E.2d at 1210 n.8 (citing Cohasset School Comm., No. 
MUP-419 (1974)). 
36 School Comm. of Newton, 388 Mass. at 569, 447 N.E.2d at 1210 (citing Boston School 
Comm., 4 M.L.C. 1912, 1915 (1978); City of Somerville, 4 M.L.C. 1307, 1311 (1977); Town 
of N. Andover, 1 M.L.C. 1103, 1107 (1974)). In some cases, no waiver was found. See City 
of Everett, 2 M.L.C. 1471, 1476 (1976), aff' d, Labor Relations Comm'n v. Everett, 7 Mass. 
App. Ct. 826 (1979). The Court noted that decisions under the National Labor Relations Act 
have dealt similarly with the issue of waiver. NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 3-83-84 
(2d Cir. 1%7) (waiver); Metromedia, Inc., KMBC-TV v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182, 1189 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (no waiver). 
37 388 Mass. at 570, 447 N.E.2d at 1211. 
38 Id. at 571, 447 N.E.2d at 1211. 
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Commission had further found that the School Committee did not intend 
"to solve its differences" with the Association at the bargaining table and 
thus had refused to bargain in good faith in violation of section 10(a)(5). 39 
The Court affirmed both findings. As to the first, the Court concluded 
that ''a failure to meet and negotiate when there is a duty to do so and 
unilateral action without prior discussion can constitute an unlawful re-
fusal to bargain, without regard to the party's good or bad faith. " 40 
According to the Court, substantial evidence supported the Commission's 
finding on this issueY The Commission, the Court found, correctly de-
termined that the School Committee's participation in the meetings held 
on June 29 and 30, just before the effective date of the layoffs, at which 
the parties discussed the reduction-in-force issue, did not serve to fulfill 
its bargaining obligation. 42 The fact that the parties reached an impasse, 
the Court concluded, did not permit the School Committee's unilateral 
action. 43 The Court concurred with the Commission's view that the bar-
gaining process was "artificially shortened," stating specifically that "the 
School Committee could not refuse to bargain for a period of over four 
months, negotiate for two days prior to implementation of a change, and 
then contend that it had fulfilled its bargaining obligation. " 44 The Com-
mission had assumed, without deciding, that the School Committee par-
ticipated in these two days of negotiations in good faith. Nevertheless, 
according to the Court, the Commission had refused to find that the 
stalemate reached on June 30 was "a final 'impasse' permitting the em-
ployer to take unilateral action with respect to mandatory topics. " 45 The 
School Committee's course of action, the Commission had concluded, 
violated chapter 150E, section 10(a)(l) and (5). 46 
Finally, the Court turned to the question of eligibility for and determina-
tion of back pay. First, the Court held that it was within the authority of 
the Commission to order the payment of lost wagesY According to the 
Court, chapter 150E, section 11 states that, if the Commission "deter-
mines that a prohibited practice has been committed, it shall order the 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 572,447 N.E.2d at 1211 (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,741-43,747 (1962); 
Glomac Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1979), resubmitted after remand, 
600 F.2d 3 (2nd Cir. 1979); Metromedia, Inc., KMBC-TV v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182, 1188 (8th 
Cir. 1978)); cf. Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School Dist. v. Labor 
Relations Comm'n, 377 Mass. 897, 389 N.E.2d 389 (1979). 
41 388 Mass. at 575, 447 N.E.2d at 1212. 
42 Id. at 574, 447 N.E.2d at 1212. 
43 !d. 
44 Id. at 574-75, 447 N .E.2d at 1213. 
45 Id. 
46 !d. The Court noted that "[a)lthough this interpretation ofthe facts was not required, it 
was supported by substantial evidence and was otherwise lawful." !d. 
47 !d. at 575, 447 N.E.2d at 1213. 
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violator to cease the practice 'and shall take such further affirmative 
action as will comply with the provisions of [section 11].' '' 48 Section 11, 
the Court noted, further provides that the Commission '' 'shall order the 
reinstatement with or without back pay of an employee discharged or 
discriminated against in violation of the first paragraph of this section.' " 49 
The Court rejected the School Committee's arguirtent that reference to 
back pay in relation to employees who have been discharged or discrimi-
nated against is a limitation on what "affirmative action" may be ordered 
under section 11.50 In response to the School Committee's argument that a 
back pay order dictates an agreement between the parties, the Court 
found that the purpose of such an order is to restore the status quo. 51 
Having established the Commission's authority to order retroactive 
compensation, the Court next considered whether the Commission should 
have ordered full back pay from the date of layoff to the date of offers to 
reinstate. The School Committee's failure to bargain over the layoff 
decision, the Court found, justified a back pay order. 52 The Court also 
sustained the Commission's conclusion that none of the four conditions 
recognized by the National Labor Relations Board ("the NLRB")53 
existed here to justify early termination of back pay as a matter of law. 54 
Moreover, the Court concluded that the Commission had the authority 
under section 11 to award interest and that such an award was consistent 
with federal practice:55 The Legislature, the Court noted, had granted the 
Commission considerable discretion under section 11 in fashioning an 
appropriate remedy. 56 
The School Committee, questioning whether the Commission had 
properly computed damages, argued that the burden of proof should have 
been on the employees with respect to mitigation of damages. 57 The 
48 !d. (quoting G.L. c. 150E § 11). 
49 !d. 
50 !d. at 576, 447 N.E.2d at 1213. 
51 /d. 
52 /d. at 577, 447 N.E.2d at 1214. 
53 The four conditions are (1) an agreement is reached, (2) the parties bargain to a bona 
fide impasse, (3) the union fails seasonably to request bargaining or to respond to a 
bargaining request, or (4) the union fails to bargain in good faith. See Transmarine Naviga-
tion Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1968); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 788, 792 
(1964). 
54 388 Mass. at 578, 447 N.E.2d at 1215. 
55 /d. at 579, 447 N.E.2d at 1215 (citing Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 716 
(1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 322 
F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1963)). 
56 !d. at 580, 447 N.E.2d at 1215. The Court distinguished its decision in Broadhurst v. 
Director of Div. of Employment Security, 373 Mass. 720, 369 N.E.2d 1018 (1977), which 
held that interest cannot be awarded on improperly denied unemployment benefits. 
57 388 Mass. at 580, 447 N.E.2d at 1215-16. 
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Court, however, sustained the Commission's holding that the burden of 
proof should be on the employer, noting that such a placement was 
consistent with Massachusetts law and NLRB cases. 58 The Court also 
agreed with other Commission conclusions with respect to computation of 
back pay, including the reduction of back pay by the amount of unem-
ployment compensation received by the custodians.59 
The importance of School Committee of Newton is evident in a number 
of areas. It is apparent from School Committee of Newton that, on 
matters of legal interpretation of the statutes which the Labor Relations 
Commission is responsible for applying, the Supreme Judicial Court will 
accord considerable deference to Commission decisions, particularly if 
the Commission applies time-honored interpretations of the National 
Labor Relations Act. 
School Committee of Newton also instructs that, unless a decision of a 
school committee affecting terms and conditions of employment directly 
implicates educational policy, the school committee will be obligated to 
bargain about aspects of the matter. As a result, the question of whether 
or not a decision implicates educational policy is likely to be heavily 
debated in future cases. It is not clear from the Court's opinion why the 
Newton School Committee decided to reduce forces. An unanswered 
question, therefore, is whether educational policy would by implicated, 
for example, if a reduction in force were necessary because of financial 
exigencies and the continuation of educational programs was at stake. 
The important consideration for both public employers and collective 
bargaining representatives is that the rules governing their conduct be 
clear. In most instances, the obligation to bargain is not onerous. Rarely is 
there insufficient time to bargain over a decision. It would certainly be 
advisable, therefore, for a public employer, unless it is crystal clear that a 
decision is not bargainable, to offer the bargaining representative the 
opportunity to negotiate. If an employer believes that a decision may not 
require bargaining, the employer could nevertheless engage in the bar-
gaining process, while reserving its rights on that question. 
Finally, School Committee of Newton suggests one noteworthy distinc-
tion between Labor Relations Commission and NLRB decisions relating 
to the reliance upon a "zipper" clause as the basis for a finding of waiver. 
Under current NLRB case law, the Board has been reluctant to base a 
finding of waiver on a zipper clause alone. The Commission and the 
Court, however, appear willing to do so. 6° Consequently, school commit-
58 /d. at 580, 447 N.E.2d at 1216. See M. Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 336, 337 
(9th Cir. 1980); Marine Welding & Repair Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
59 388 Mass. at 581, 447 N.E.2d at 1216. 
60 See supra note 35. 
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tees and other public employers should consider seeking an appropriate 
zipper clause if they wish to obviate their obligation to bargain over 
mid-term decisions which alter non-contract terms and conditions of 
employment. 
§ 9.3. Public Employer- Right to Implement Last Offer After Impasse 
but Before Fact-Finding. The impasse resolution procedures set forth in 
sections 8 and 9 of chapter 150E, the Public Employee Collective Bargain-
ing Law, distinguish this statute from both the Massachusetts private 
sector labor law.~ and the National Labor Relations Act. 2 Under federal 
law, an employer may implement unilaterally all or part of its offer to a 
union if an impasse has been reached in negotiations. 3 Chapter 150E, 
however, contains a provision not found in either the federal law or the 
Massachusetts private sector labor law. Section 10(a)(6) of chapter 150E 
makes it an unfair labor practice for a public employer to refuse to 
participate in good faith in the mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration 
procedures set forth in sections 8 and 9. For public employees, other than 
those employed as police and fire personnel, fact-finding is the final stage 
in the impasse resolution process and takes place only after an impasse 
has been certified by a state mediator. 4 Until the Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision in Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers & Scientists 
v. Labor Relations Commission,5 ("MOSES"), it was unclear whether a 
public employer could unilaterally implement its offer after an impasse in 
bargaining had been reached, but prior to completion of fact-finding, 
without violating section 10(a)(6). 
In MOSES, the Massachusetts Organization of State Engineers and 
Scientists ("MOSES") and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office 
of Employee Relations (the "Commonwealth") were parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement which ran through June 30, 1980.6 Article 29 of 
the agreement provided, "[s]hould a successor agreement not be exe-
cuted by July 1, 1980, this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect 
until a successor agreement is executed or an impasse in negotiations is 
reached." 7 No agreement was concluded by July 1, 1980, and on August 
6, 1980, MOSES petitioned the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and 
Arbitration for mediation pursuant to section 9 of chapter 150E.8 On 
§ 9.3. I G.L. c. 150A. 
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
3 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
4 G.L. c. 105E, § 9. 
5 389 Mass. 920, 452 N.E.2d 1117 (1983). 
6 Id. at 921, 452 N.E.2d at 1118. 
7 Id. (quoting Article 29 of the collective bargaining agreement). 
8 /d. 
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September 16, a mediator declared an impasse and certified the matter for 
fact-finding.9 A fact-finder was appointed. Prior to the commencement of 
fact-finding, a meeting between the parties was held under the auspices of 
the mediator. At that meeting, the Commonwealth presented to MOSES, 
through the mediator, a number of work rules changes, some of which 
were to go into effect that day. 10 The changes in work rules conformed to 
the Commonwealth's previous bargaining position. 11 
Fact-finding began in December, 1980, and in January, 1981, MOSES 
filed charges with the Labor Relations Commission (the "Commission") 
alleging that the Commonwealth had failed to bargain and participate in 
good faith in fact-finding as required by chapter 150E, section 10(a)(5) and 
(6).12 Following hearings, the Commission ruled that the unilateral 
changes made by the Commonwealth were lawful because an impasse in 
bargaining had been reached. MOSES appealed the Commission's rul-
ing.13 
In February, 1981, the Commonwealth announced a decision to layoff 
employees in the bargaining unit represented by MOSES. 14 MOSES filed 
a grievance, alleging that the Commonwealth had used incorrect seniority 
credits in determining which employees were to be laid off. MOSES 
unsuccessfully sought arbitration in the grievance procedure. The Com-
monwealth refused to arbitrate on the ground that no arbitration agree-
ment was in effect. 15 In June, 1981, MOSES requested bargaining con-
cerning the impact of the transfer of employees from one department to 
another on the seniority rights of its members. Meetings were held but no 
bargaining took place, and the transfers became final in July, 1981.16 
MOSES brought charges against the Commonwealth in June, 1981, 
because of its refusal to arbitrate the layoffs and to bargain over the 
transfers. 17 The Commission ruled that the Commonwealth's duty to 
arbitrate and. to bargain had expired when it bargained to impasse. 18 
MOSES appealed and the two cases were transferred to the Supreme 
Judicial Court on its own motion. 19 
MOSES contended that "the statutorily-sanctioned fact-finding proce-
dures are an integral part of the public sector negotiating process and that, 
9 /d. 
10 !d. at 922, 452 N.E.2d at IllS. 





16 Id. at 922-23, 452 N .E.2d at lll9. 
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therefore, an impasse which would permit a public employer to initiate 
unilateral changes cannot legally occur prior to completion of fact-
finding. " 20 In addition, MOSES argued, unilateral changes prior to com-
pletion of fact-finding should be per se unlawful as a matter of policy 
because otherwise a public employer would "hold an unfair economic 
advantage over public employees who unlike their private sector 
counter-parts, are forbidden by law to strike. " 21 
Stating that the issue was one of statutory interpretation, the Court 
noted it gives deference to an administrative interpretation of a statute, 
especially" 'where, as here, an agency must interpret a legislative policy 
which is only broadly set out in the governing statute.' " 22 Nothing in 
either the statute itself or its legislative history, the Court observed, 
suggested that implementation of unilateral changes prior to completion of 
fact-finding was either allowed or prohibited. 23 The Court then turned to 
the Commission's interpretation and application of the statute. 24 
According to the Court, as early as 1974, the Commission had relied 
upon the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Katz 25 and ruled that a 
public employer could not make unilateral changes in mandatory subjects 
of bargaining without negotiating with the union representing its employ-
ees.26 In 1979, the Court noted, the Commission held in Hanson School 
Committee, 27 that a public employer could implement a change unilater-
ally where an impasse in bargaining had been reached, even though the 
mediator had made no formal declaration of impasse. 28 In Hanson, ac-
cording to the Court, the Commission "stated that although the existence 
of a legitimate impasse merely suspended, but did not terminate, a party's 
obligation to bargain in good faith, '[a]fter good faith negotiations have 
exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement, an employer may 
implement unilateral changes which are reasonably comprehended within 
its pre-impasse proposals.' " 29 The Court reasoned that it was evident 
from the Commission's decisions30 that the Commission "has consistently 
applied principles derived from private sector bargaining cases to cases ... 
20 /d. at 923, 452 N.E.2d at 1119. 
21 /d. at 923-24, 452 N.E.2d at 1119. 
22 /d. at 924, 452 N.E.2d at 1120 (quoting School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of 
Education, 362 Mass. 417, 442, 287 N.E.2d 438, 455 (1972)). 
23 389 Mass. at 924-25, 452 N.E.2d at 1120. 
24 /d. 
25 369 u.s. 736 (1962). 
26 389 Mass. at 926, 452 N .E.2d at 1121. 
27 5 M.L.C. 1671 (1979). 
28 389 Mass. at 926, 452 N.E.2d at 1121. 
29 /d. at 926-27, 452 N.E.2d at 1121 (quoting Hanson, 5 M.L.C. at 1675-76). 
30 See id. at 927, 452 N.E.2d at 1121 (citing Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 8 M.L.C. 
1499, 1502 (1981); New Bedford School Comm., 8 M.L.C. 1472, 1477 (1981)). 
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involving public employers where issue was the legitimacy of unilat-
eral changes after impasse."31 
Reviewing the Commission's reasoning, the Court determined that it 
would not disagree, either as a matter of law or public policy, with the 
Commission's interpretation. First, the Commission had concluded that, 
because a dispute is returned to the parties for further bargaining if the 
impasse continues after publication of the fact-finder's report, the logical 
extension of MOSES's argument would be that a public employer could 
not implement changes even after completion of fact-finding, a result the 
Commission found untenable. 32 Second, the Commission had noted that 
in drafting chapter 150E, the Legislature had drawn heavily on the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and that, "if the Legislature had intended to 
reject Federal precedent in this area it would have done so explicitly. " 33 
Finally, the Commission had reviewed federal decisions which held, ''that 
a party's use of economic weapons to resolve a labor impasse was not 
inconsistent with a good faith willingness to bargain and reach settle-
ment. " 34 
The Court stated that its decision in MOSES was foreshadowed by its 
recent statement in School Committee of Newton v. Labor Relations 
Commission 35 that "[i]n the absence of impasse, unilateral action by an 
employer concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining violates the duty 
to bargain in good faith. " 36 
Concerning the refusal to arbitrate and bargain, the Court concluded 
that MOSES's argument hinged on the legal validity of the Commission's 
finding of impasse. Since the Commission's finding was not improper, the 
Commission's holding on this point was affirmed. 37 
The Court's decision in MOSES is well-reasoned and logical. The 
principle that an employer may implement changes unilaterally after an 
impasse in bargaining has been reached is based upon a necessary ac-
commodation between a union's interest in having issues resolved 
through bargaining and an employer's interest in not being foreclosed 
from making changes without a union's agreement. This policy of ac-
commodation is as applicable under chapter 150E as it is under the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
The MOSES decision will be greeted more with relief than joy by public 
employers. Unilateral implementation is a measure that employers will 
use only under extreme circumstances because of the damage such an 
31 389 Mass. at 927, 452 N.E.2d at 1121. 
32 Id. at 927-28, 452 N.E.2d at 1122. 
33 Id. at 928, 452 N.E.2d at 1122. 
34 Id. 
30 388 Mass. 557, 447 N.E.2d 1201 (1983). 
38 389 Mass. at 928, 452 N.E.2d at 1122. 
37 Id. at 929, 452 N.E.2d at 1122. 
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action inevitably -does to the relationship between the parties. Neverthe-
less, had MOSES been decided the opposite way, it would have meant, 
from a practical standpoint, that a public employer who needed to make 
changes would have been stymied for months if not years. Such a result 
would have imposed untenable limitations on the ability of public employ-
ers to take necessary actions. 
§ 9.4. Obligation to Arbitrate Issues Arising Out of Expired Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered whether under Massachusetts law there is a duty to 
arbitrate issues arising out of a collective bargaining agreement that has 
expired. In Boston Lodge 264, District 38, International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-C/0 v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, 1 the plaintiff Union sought to compel the 
defendant Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("Authority") to 
arbitrate the Authority's failure to make certain cost ofliving adjustments 
allegedly required by a collective bargaining agreement.2 The Agreement, 
which expired on December 31, 1977, provided for "cost-of-living ad-
justments to be made quarterly 'during the term of the Agreement and 
during any period of negotiations thereafter, unless and until the Parties, 
by agreement, provide otherwise.' " 3 The Agreement also included a 
clause requiring binding arbitration to resolve grievances arising out of the 
"terms and provisions of this Agreement.' ' 4 
The Authority continued to make quarterly cost-of-living adjustments 
after the agreement expired, through September, 1980.5 The employees 
continued to work without a contract, being compensated as if the expired 
agreement were in effect. 6 In December, 1980, however, the Authority 
refused to make the quarterly cost-of-living adjustments. 7 The Union filed 
a grievance, which the Authority denied. 8 When the Authority also re-
fused to arbitrate the dispute, the Union sought an order to compel 
arbitration. 9 
The superior court dismissed the complaint because no collective bar-
gaining agreement was in effect. 10 In addition, the court concluded that 
the Authority was barred by statute from making the cost-of-living ad-
§ 9.4. 1 389 Mass. 819, 452 N.E.2d 1155 (1983). 
2 Id. at 819-20, 452 N.E.2d at 1155. 
3 !d. at 820,452 N.E.2d at 1155 (quoting the agreement) (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 820, 452 N.E.2d at 1155-56. 
7 !d. at 820, 452 N.E.2d at 1156. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. 
10 Id. at 820, 452 N.E.2d at 1155. 
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justments. 11 The case was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court on its 
own motion. 12 The Court reversed the judgment, finding an agreement to 
arbitrate the issue of the Authority's obligation to pay the disputed cost-
of-living increases, and no statutory bar to payment of such increases if 
the arbitrator determined that the collective bargaining agreement re-
quired them. 13 
According to the Court, a provision in a collective bargaining agree-
ment for continued compensation during negotiations after the agreement 
expires is reasonable. Therefore, the Court stated, the issue whether 
negotiations were continuing in December, 1980, so as to require payment 
of the cost-of-living adjustments, arose out of the terms and provisions of 
the expired agreement and should be submitted to arbitration. 14 In support 
of this conclusion, the Court reasoned that although the collective bar-
gaining agreement had expired, both the contractual obligation to make 
cost-of-living adjustments under certain conditions and the duty to arbit-
rate any unresolved grievance arising out of the agreement survived. 15 
The Court next dismissed the Authority's contention that it was barred 
by statute from paying the adjustments. The Authority relied upon two 
acts16 passed after the effective date of the agreement between the Au-
thority and the UnionY The Court concluded that both statutes were 
concerned with interest arbitration and future contracts, and did not 
govern cost-of-living provisions in agreements in force at the time the act 
was passed, or bar enforcement of agreements to pay cost-of-living ad-
justments after the expiration of a contract period. 18 
Finally, the Court distinguished the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit 
Union v. Massachusetts, 19 which upheld the constitutionality of the two 
acts "as applied to an existing contract that purported to provide for a 




14 /d. at 821, 452 N.E.2d at 1156. 
15 /d. 
16 G.L. c. 161A was amended in 1978 "to prescribe certain interest arbitration procedures 
between the MBTA and its unions." Boston Lodge 264, 389 Mass. at 822, 452 N .E.2d at 
1156. G.L. c. 161A, § 19, was amended in 1980 to "prohibit the MBTA from bargaining 
collectively or entering into a contract which provides for automatic cost-of-living salary 
adjustments based on changes in the Consumer Price Index or other similar adjustments 
unless specifically authorized by law." Boston Lodge 264, 389 Mass. at 822, 452 N.E.2d at 
1156-57. 
17 Id. at 821, 452 N.E.2d at 1157. 
18 Id. at 822, 452 N .E.2d at 1157. 
19 666 F.2d 618, 640 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982). 
20 Boston Lodge 264, 389 Mass. at 823, 452 N.E.2d at 1157. 
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that Local Div. 589 did not involve "the rights of the Commonwealth to 
abrogate the obligation to make cost-of-living adjustments expressed in an 
agreement already in effect. " 21 
The decision of the Court in Boston Lodge 264 is consistent with the 
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Nolde Bros. v. Local 
No. 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union, 22 in which the Court 
held, as a matter of federal labor policy, that, unless the parties have 
expressly indicated otherwise, disputes which arise after the contract has 
expired, but which "arise under" the contract, are subject to the arbitra-
tion provisions of the expired contract. By its decision, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has adopted this policy of favoring arbitration as the mech-
anism for resolving all disputes arising under a collective bargaining 
contract, even those disputes which occur after the contract has expired. 
An employer who intends not to be bound to arbitrate such disputes must 
ensure that this intention is expressly set forth in its contract. 
§ 9.5. Public Employer- Obligation to Reinstate Strikers Who Engaged 
in an Unlawful Strike. The Supreme Judicial Court, in Utility Workers of 
America, Local466 v. Labor Relations Commission, 1 decided that a town 
that had not petitioned the Labor Relations Commission for an order 
directing unlawful strikers to return to work was not thereafter prohibited 
by chapter 150E, section 9A from refusing to permit such strikers to 
return to work immediately at the conclusion of the strike. 2 The case 
arose when night shift water department and waste disposal employees in 
the town of Braintree (the "Town"), who were represented by the Utility 
Workers of America, Local466 (the "Union"), called in sick on April28, 
1981 to protest the lack of progress in collective bargaining negotiations 
with the Town.3 Off-duty employees refused to replace them.4 The morn-
ing shifts on April 29, 1981 also failed to report to work and picket lines 
were formed at both departments. 5 Management personnel operated both 
the water department facilities and the Town's incinerator during the first 
day of the strike. 6 Several incidents of vandalism occurred at the water 
department during the work stoppage. 7 On the morning of April29, 1981, 
arrangements were made by the Town's incinerator consultant with other 
waste processor plants to dispose of refuse normally burned at the Town's 
21 /d. 
22 430 u.s. 243 (1977). 
§ 9.5. 1 389 Mass. 500, 451 N.E.2d 124 (1983). 
2 /d. at 506-07, 451 N.E.2d at 128. 
3 /d. at 501-02, 451 N.E.2d at 125. 
4 /d. at 502, 451 N.E.2d at 125. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. at 501-02, 451 N.E.2d at 125. 
7 /d. at 502, 451 N.E.2d at 125. 
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incinerator, but in order to make such arrangements, the Town had to 
commit itself to using such alternative plants for at least one week. 8 The 
water department was the Town's sole provider and source of water for 
industrial and domestic use, and for fire protection. 9 
Also on the morning of April 29, a national representative of the Union 
arrived in Braintree. 10 After learning that the Town's selectmen had 
decided on April 28 to make a new offer to the Union, he met with the 
employees, and they decided to return to work for night shifts that 
evening. 11 Town officials, however, were not so advised. 12 Early that 
evening, the national representative informed the superintendent of the 
water department that the strike was over and that the midnight shift 
would report for work. 13 The Town officials did not know that the return 
to work decision had been made at a Union meeting. 14 Town officials 
decided that the water department employees would not be permitted to 
return to work that evening because of "uncertainty as to whether the 
men would actually return to work and concern about the vandalism that 
had occurred at the water department. " 15 Later that evening, the Union 
also informed Town officials that incinerator employees would be return-
ing to work on the night shift, but the Town decided not to permit the 
employees to return to work until further notice. 16 On May 1, all striking 
employees were suspended for one week for having engaged in an unlaw-
ful strikeY 
The Union filed charges with the Labor Relations Commission (the 
"Commission"), alleging that the Town had engaged in prohibited prac-
tices in violation of chapter 150E, section 10(a)(l), (3), (4) and (5), by 
locking out the employees. 18 Following the issuance of, and hearings on a 
complaint alleging violations of section 10(a)(l) and (5), the Commission 
decided that the Town's action was "a response to the unlawful work 
stoppage, and was intended to preserve and protect public services. " 19 
Accordingly, the Commission concluded, the Town did not violate sec-
tion 9A(a) or bargain in bad faith in violation of section 10(a)(l) and (5). 20 







15 Id. at 502-03, 451 N.E.2d at 126. 
16 Id. at 503, 451 N.E.2d at 126. 
17 ld. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court took the case on its own motion and affirmed 
the Commission's decision. 21 
The Court, referring to the language in chapter 150E, section 9A(b),22 
noted that the Town did not file a petition with the Commission for an 
order directing the employees to stop striking under section 9A(b). 23 The 
Union contended that the presence of the word "shall" in the first sen-
tence of section 9A(b) required the Town "to petition the commission and 
that the filing of this petition is the only action which a public employer is 
authorized to take when confronted with an illegal work stoppage by its 
employees. " 24 The Commission's position was that filing a petition was 
not the exclusive means by which a public employer may deal with an 
unlawful strike; rather, the petition was necessary only as a "prerequisite 
to obtaining administrative or judicial relief from violations by employees 
of [section] 9A(a). " 25 
The Court concluded that the Commission's decision was correct. 
According to the Court, nothing in the language of section 9A(b) indicates 
that ''by creating the petitioning process the Legislature intended to limit 
the means by which a public employer may respond to an illegal work 
stoppage. " 26 The Court refused to read section 9A(b) as precluding a 
public employer from acting to protect threatened essential public ser-
vices until it has petitioned the Commission and received an answer. 27 
According to the Court, a public employer acting in good faith must be 
permitted to take emergency actions to prevent public services from being 
disrupted. The Court noted that "[a] contrary interpretation of the statu-
tory language would severely limit the ability of the employer to protect 
and maintain important public services while waiting for the commission 
to complete its investigation. " 28 In addition, the Court found that the 
Commission was justified in deciding that the Town did not violate section 
9A(b) by preventing the employees from returning to work until the Town 
21 ld. 
22 Id. at 503, 451 N.E.2d at 126. 
Whenever a strike occurs or is about to occur, the employer shall petition the 
commission to make an investigation. If, after investigation, the commission deter-
mines that any provision of paragraph (a) of this section has been or is about to be 
violated, it shall immediately set requirements that must be complied with, including, 
but not limited to, instituting appropriate proceedings in the superior court for the 
county wherein such violation has occurred or is about to occur for enforcement of 
such requirements. 
G.L. c. 150E, § 9A(b). 
23 G.L. c. 150E, § 9A(6). 389 Mass. at 503, 451 N.E.2d at 126. 
24 ld. 
25 Jd. at 503-04, 451 N.E.2d at 126. 
26 Jd. at 504, 451 N.E.2d at 127. 
27 Id. 
28 Jd. at 505, 451 N.E.2d at 127. 
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could determine that water and incinerator services would not be dis-
rupted by further illegal work stoppages or vandalism. 29 Rejecting the 
Union's argument that lockouts are per se unlawful, the Court noted that 
lockouts are not mentioned, much less prohibited, in chapter 150E.30 
Finally, the Court sustained the Commission's finding that the Town 
did not violate section 10(a)(l) and (5). 31 The Union contended that the 
lockout was undertaken to gain a prohibited bargaining advantage. 32 The 
Court, however, noted that the Union presented no evidence that the 
Town was improperly motivated in its actions. 33 On the other hand, the 
Court concluded, substantial evidence supported the Commission's 
finding that the Town's actions were justifiable responses to an unex-
pected job action and the possibility of further vandalism and strikes. 34 
The significance of this decision lies in the Court's conclusion that the 
strike petition process is not a limitation on a public employer's legitimate 
"self-help" efforts to deal with an illegal work stoppage. The Commis-
sion's interpretation of section 9A(a) was reasonable. Given the delays 
inherent in the strike petition process, a contrary interpretation would 
have severely impaired the ability of a public employer to operate in the 
face of a strike. 
Although the Court's handling of the Union's argument that a lockout is 
per se unlawful is also noteworthy, it would be dangerous to read into the 
Court's conclusion more than is warranted. The Court was careful to note 
that "[b]oth parties use the term 'lockout' in referring to the employer's 
refusal to allow the employees to work immediately at the end of the 
strike. We take no position on whether that term properly applies to the 
employer's acts in this case." 35 The essence of the decision in Utility 
Workers is that the town of Braintree took reasonable defensive mea-
sures designed to protect itself. The Commission and the Court .are likely 
to evaluate other "defensive" measures taken by public employers on a 
case-by-case basis. A public employer would probably have difficulty 
sustaining the legitimacy of an "offensive" lockout, i.e., a lockout that is 
designed to exert pressure on a bargaining unit to accept a public employ-
er's bargaining position, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to 
the term "lockout" in the statute. Although an offensive lockout is lawful 
under the National Labor Relations Act,36 because no right to strike is 
29 /d. 
30 ld. 
31 !d. at 506, 451 N.E.2d at 127. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 506, 451 N.E.2d at 128. 
34 ld. 
35 Id. at 501 n.1, 451 N.E.2d at 125 n.l. 
36 See American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). 
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similarly included in chapter 150E, such a lockout would probably be 
viewed differently under state law than under federal law. 
§ 9.6. Public Employer- Exclusive Managerial Prerogatives. In recent 
years, the Supreme Judicial Court has developed the doctrine that, as a 
matter of public policy, certain matters are beyond the scope of collective 
bargaining in the public sector because they fall within the public employ-
er's exclusive managerial prerogative. Under this doctrine, a public em-
ployer may not be compelled to bargain about a matter that is within its 
exclusive managerial prerogative. Moreover, a public employer may not 
be required to comply with a contractual restriction on its prerogatives to 
which it may have agreed. Finally, a public employer may refuse to 
comply with an arbitration award finding a contractual violation for failure 
on the part of the public employer to adhere to a restriction on its 
prerogatives. 1 
A. Transfer of Prosecutorial Duties Out of Bargaining Unit 
The principle of exclusive managerial prerogative was applied by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Town of Burlington v. Labor Relations Com-
mission. 2 The issue in Town of Burlington was whether the town of 
Burlington (the "Town") had the right to unilaterally reassign prosecuto-
rial duties from officers of the Town's police department, whose members 
were unionized, to town counsel. 
Burlington police officers had prosecuted criminal cases in the district 
court for many years. 3 In February, 1979, the court's presiding judge 
notified the Town's police chief that the Town's case load was too great 
for the one prosecuting officer assigned to handle the Town's criminal 
cases. 4 The judge suggested the addition of a second police prosecutor 
and improved preparation of cases. A second prosecuting officer was 
therefore designated. 5 At the same time, the Town's selectmen decided to 
cease using police prosecutors and to assign the prosecution of criminal 
cases to town counsel. 6 Although collective bargaining negotiations with 
the International Brotherhood of Police Officers (the "IBPO") were in 
progress for a new contract, the selectmen did not raise the issue in 
§ 9.6. 1 Ross, Labor and Employment Law, 1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 7.5, at 181; 
see also decisions collected in School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm., 388 
Mass. 557, 563-64 n.4, 447 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 n.4 (1983), for cases involving the powers of 
school committees. 
2 390 Mass. 157, 454 N.E.2d 465 (1983). 
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negotiation. 7 The IBPO heard rumors of the impending change before the 
contract was signed in May.8 On June 6, 1979, the Town voted at a town 
meeting to amend its by-law, enabling the selectmen to implement their 
plan.9 The two police prosecutors were then reassigned to other duties at 
a reduction in pay. 10 
The IBPO filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Labor Relations 
Commission (the "Commission") and sought to require the selectmen to 
bargain over the issue of reassigning prosecutorial duties previously per-
formed by police prosecutors. 11 The selectmen did not respond to the 
charge and the Commission issued a complaint alleging that the Town had 
engaged in a prohibited practice within the meaning of chapter 150E, 
section 10(a)(l) and (5). 12 
A commission hearing officer ordered the Town to cease and desist 
from reassigning prosecutorial duties without first bargaining with the 
IBP0. 13 In addition, the Town was ordered to reinstitute the past practice 
of assigning prosecutorial duties to the bargaining unit and to reimburse 
the two officers for lost wages. 14 The Commission affirmed the decision of 
the hearing officer. 15 The Town appealed to the superior court and the 
IBPO intervened. 16 Both the IBPO and the Commission filed a coun-
terclaim alleging noncompliance with the Commission's decisionY The 
Town and Commission both moved for summary judgment. 18 The 
superior court dismissed the complaint and affirmed the Commission's 
decision in its entirety. 19 The Town appealed and the case was transferred 
to the Supreme Judicial Court on its own motion. 20 
The Commission had based its ruling on prior commission decisions 
that contracting out bargaining unit work is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. 21 Both the Commission and the superior court had rejected the 
7 !d. 
8 /d. 
9 /d. at 158-59, 454 N.E.2d at 466. 
10 /d. 
11 Id. at 158-59, 454 N.E.2d at 466-67. 
12 /d. at 159, 454 N.E.2d at 467. G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(l) and (5) provides: 
(a) It shall be a prohibited practice for a public employer or its designated representa-
tive to: (l) Interfere, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right 
guaranteed under this chapter; ... (5) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with 
the exclusive representative as required in section six. 
13 390 Mass. at 159, 454 N.E.2d at 467. 
14 Id. at 159-60, 454 N.E.2d at 467. 






21 /d. at 161, 454 N.E.2d at 467 (citing City of Boston, 6 M.L.C. 1117 (1979); City of 
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Town's argument that a decision to reassign the prosecutorial function is a 
managerial prerogative. 22 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding 
that the Commission's decision was erroneous as a matter of law. 23 
The Court noted that pursuant to chapter 278, section 15, city solicitors, 
town counsel or other persons may be appointed to represent a city or 
town in prosecutions in district courts under the municipality's by-laws, 
orders, rules or regulations, and to do anything concerning such prosecu-
tion that may be done by the district attorney. 24 The Court also observed 
that the statutes do not address the matter of prosecution of criminal cases 
in the district court where neither the district attorney nor the city sol-
icitor or town counsel appears. 25 These cases, according to the Court, are 
frequently prosecuted by a member of the municipality's police depart-
ment. 26 The decision as to who shall be assigned the prosecution of cases 
in the district court, the Court found, is a decision which falls within the 
exclusive managerial prerogatives ofthe Town, subject only to the author-
ity of the attorney general or district attorney. The Court therefore con-
cluded that the Town may designate who will prosecute criminal cases in 
a district court. The public policy inherent in that designation, the Court 
reasoned, "is so comparatively heavy that collective bargaining, and even 
voluntary arbitration on the subject is, as a matter of law, to be denied 
effect." 27 Consequently, the Court held that the decision to assign pro-
secutorial duties is not a proper subject for collective bargaining. 28 The 
Court also found that, although the Town reserved the decision to reas-
sign the prosecutorial function, the circumstances favoring bargaining on 
the impact of the Town's decision were strong. 29 The Court was careful to 
note, however, that its holding only determined that, in this case, bargain-
ing over the impact of the Town's decision would not have been an 
interference with the Town's " 'right to determine ... policy.' " 30 
The decision in Town of Burlington demonstrates an accommodation 
between a public employer's obligation to bargain over decisions that 
affect wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment, and the em-
ployer's need to be insulated from bargaining over decisions that lie at the 
Boston, 4 M.L.C. 1202 (1977); Town of Andover, 4 M.L.C. 1086 (1977); Town of Danvers, 3 
M.L.C. 1560 (1977)); cf. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
22 390 Mass. at 161, 454 N.E.2d at 467-68. 
23 /d. at 161, 454 N.E.2d at 468. 
24 /d. at 162, 454 N.E.2d at 468. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. at 164, 454 N.E.2d at 469. 
28 /d. 
29 /d. at 165, 454 N.E.2d at 470. 
30 /d. at 167, 454 N.E.2d at 471 (quoting School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations 
Commission, 388 Mass. 557, 566, 447 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (1983)). 
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heart of its mission. The "exclusive managerial prerogative" concept in 
Massachusetts' public employee labor law is analogous to the concept 
under the federal labor law that decisions that "lie at the core of entrep-
reneurial control" are not mandatory subjects of bargaining even though 
they affect terms and conditions of employment. 31 There is, however, a 
critical distinction. A matter within a public employer's exclusive man-
agerial prerogative is beyond the power of the public employer to limit by 
contract. Contractual commitments that infringe upon such prerogatives 
are unenforceable because they are inconsistent with the public employ-
er's statutory responsibilities. Under federal law, on the other hand, if a 
private employer agrees to limit its power over matters that lie at the core 
of its entrepreneurial control, such obligations are binding and enforce-
able contractual commitments. 
B. A Defense to Prohibited Practice Charge 
A fundamental principle under the National Labor Relations Act is that 
an employer may not discharge an employee for filing a grievance under a 
collective bargaining agreement. 32 During the Survey year, the Massachu-
setts Appeals Court, in School Committee of East Brookfield v. Labor 
Relations Commission,33 considered the application of this principle in a 
public employment context. In East Brookfield the appeals court also 
considered what deference should be accorded to decisions of the Massa-
chusetts Labor Relations Commission (the "Commission") and whether 
the definition of "professional employee" in chapter 150E, section P 4 
applies to "educators" who are not "teachers" within the meaning of 
chapter 71, section 38G. 35 
31 See,, e.g., First National Maintenance Corp.v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Otis 
Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162 (1984); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring 
Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (1984). 
32 John Sexton & Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 80, 88 L.R.R.M. 1502 (1975); Ernst Steel Corp., 212 
N.L.R.B. 78, 87 L.R.R.M. 1508 (1974). 
33 16 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 449 N.E.2d 672 (1983). 
34 Under G.L. c. 150E, § 1, a "professional employee" is defined as: 
any employee engaged in work (i) predominately intellectual and varied in character 
as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work, (ii) involving the 
consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance, (iii) of such a 
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized 
in relation to a given period of time, and (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type 
in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of 
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a 
hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprentice-
ship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual or physical 
processes. 
35 G.L. c. 71, § 38G provides: 
No person shall be eligible for employment by a school committee ... unless [she) 
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Carol Nason was hired by the East Brookfield School Committee (the 
"School Committee") as an "art instructor,"36 even though she was 
neither certified, nor certifiable, as a teacherY The School Committee 
hired Nason when it was unsuccessful in recruiting an art teacher. 38 
During the five years she was employed in such capacity, Nason was paid 
a pro-rata share of the noncertified teacher salary. 39 At the start of the 
1976-77 school year, Nason asked her principal how she could obtain a 
raise. 40 He referred her to the East Brookfield Teachers Association (the 
"Association"), which was the exclusive representative of "all profes-
sional employees. " 41 
The collective bargaining agreement between the School Committee 
and the Association contained a salary scale only for persons who were 
certified or certifiable as teachers. 42 Nevertheless, Nason went to the 
Association with her salary question and the Association initiated a griev-
ance on her behalf, alleging in part that she was a "professional" em-
ployee within the meaning of the agreement's recognition clause and was 
being denied the benefits of the contract. 43 When her grievance was 
denied, contractual arbitration proceedings were instituted. 44 
The arbitrator found that Nason was a "professional employee" and 
thus, a member of the bargaining unit. 45 He also concluded that Nason's 
salary should not be based on the contractual salary schedule, that her 
salary had been arrived at on the basis of prior dealings and that, for the 
year in question, it had been correctly computed.46 
The arbitrator's award was appealed to the Commission. At the hear-
ing, the Commission found that the superintendent of schools, in response 
to Nason's grievance, had stated that it would be unfortunate if the 
Association persisted with the grievance, because such action could place 
the School Committee in a position where they might terminate Nason's 
has been granted by the board a certificate with respect to the type of position for 
which [she] seeks employment; ... provided ... that a school committee may upon 
its request be exempt by the board for any one school year from the requirement in 
this section to employ certified personnel when compliance therewith would in the 
opinion of the board constitute a great hardship in securing teachers for the schools of 
a town. 
36 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 48, 449 N.E.2d at 673. 
37 /d. at 47, 449 N.E.2d at 673. 
38 /d. 
39 /d. at 48, 449 N.E.2d at 673. 
40 /d. 
41 /d. 
42 /d. at 48-49, 449 N.E.2d at 673-74. 
43 /d. at 49, 449 N.E.2d at 674. 
44 /d. 
45 /d. at 49, 449 N.E.2d at 674. 
46 /d. at 49-50, 449 N.E.2d at 674. 
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employment and choose a certified art teacher. 47 According to the Com-
mission, the School Committee had taken the position that Nason was not 
a professional employee, but if she would withdraw her grievance and 
discuss her salary problem with them, the problem could be resolved. 48 If, 
however, she chose to pursue her grievance, the School Committee would 
fire her. 49 When Nason indicated her intent to pursue her grievance, the 
School Committee discharged her. 50 A prohibited practice charge alleging 
a violation of chapter 150E, section lO(a)(l) and (3) was then filed, claim-
ing that Nason was discharged unlawfully. 
The Commission concluded that Nason had established a prima facie 
case51 under the rationale of Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Rela-
tions Commission.52 The School Committee argued that Nason was dis-
charged because of a policy decision to no longer employ noncertified 
teaching personnel, not because she had filed a grievance. 53 The Commis-
sion, however, determined that the School Committee "would have con-
tinued to employ Nason in spite of the stated lawful reason for her 
discharge 'were it not for the fact that she filed a grievance to attempt to 
adjust her salary.' " 54 
On appeal by the School Committee to the superior court, the trial 
judge concluded that (1) there was insubstantial evidence that the School 
Committee would not have discharged Nason but for her decision to 
pursue her grievance; and that (2) the Commission had exceeded its 
authority in ordering the School Committee to reinstate Nason, a noncer-
tified teacher, to her former position. 55 Nason appealed, and the appeals 
47 Jd. at 50, 449 N.E.2d at 674. 
48 Jd. at 50, 449 N.E.2d at 675. 
49 ld. 
5o Id. 
51 In the establishment of a prima facie case, the appeals court noted that Nason had 
shown: 
(1) that the school committee was always aware of, but unconcerned with, her lack of 
certification until she filed her grievance; (2) that another grievant seeking recognition 
of her membership in the bargaining unit withdrew her grievance when the school 
committee indicated that a refusal to do so might result in her discharge and that 
grievant was not discharged; (3) that if Nason had withdrawn her grievance, the 
school committee would have been willing to negotiate with her individually and 
would probably have worked out with her a satisfactory salary adjustment; and (4) 
that when Nason refused to withdraw her grievance, the school committee immedi-
ately voted to discharge her. 
Id. at 51, 449 N.E.2d at 675. 
52 384 Mass. 559, 562-63, 428 N.E.2d 124, 126 (1981); see Southern Worcester County 
Regional Vocational School District v. Labor Relations Comm., 386 Mass. 414, 418-19, 436 
N.E.2d 380, 383 (1982). 
53 East Brookfield, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 50, 449 N.E.2d at 675. 
54 Id. at 51, 449 N.E.2d at 675 (quoting the Commission) (emphasis in original). 
55 !d. at 47, 449 N.E.2d at 675. 
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court reversed. 56 
The appeals court agreed with the superior court that the Commission 
had rejected the School Committee's evidence in toto, but found that it 
does not follow that the Commission's decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence. 57 The appeals court thus adopted the federal view of 
the appropriate deference to be accorded to the decision of an agency 
charged with enforcing a labor relations statute. The federal standard, set 
forth in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,58 
states: 
[T]he requirement for canvassing "the whole record" in order to ascertain 
substantiality does not furnish a calculus of value by which a reviewing 
court can assess the evidence. Nor was it intended to negative the function 
of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or 
informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose 
findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts 
do not possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to 
matters not requiring expertise a court may displace the Board's choice 
between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably 
have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.59 
According to the appeals court, the Commission had expressly found, 
and the School Committee had all but conceded, that Nason was fired "to 
avoid possibly inconvenient or expensive arbitration awards. " 60 The 
Commission, the appeals court noted, had rejected the School Commit-
tee's evidence because the Commission had disagreed with the School 
Committee's contention that it had been bound to elect one of three 
choices when Nason insisted on pressing the matter to arbitration, to wit: 
either (1) accede to the demand that Nason be paid according to the salary 
applicable to certifiable teachers; (2) proceed to arbitration, running the 
risk oflosing with no right ofreview61 and being required to pay Nason in 
the same unacceptable manner afforded under the first option; or (3) adopt 
a policy of no longer employing certifiable teaching personnel. 62 Accord-
ing to the Commission and the appeals court, there was a fourth option. 
The School Committee could have recognized Nason as a member of the 
bargaining unit, insisted that the teacher's salary scale did not apply to her 
and attempted to negotiate an appropriate scale for noncertifiable teach-
56 /d. at 47, 449 N.E.2d at 676. 
57 Id. at 52, 449 N.E.2d at 676. The superior court had reversed the Commission's 
decision because the Commission had rejected in toto the School Committee's evidence, 
much of which was either corroborated by Nason or uncontested, "without an explicit and 
objectively adequate reason." /d. 
58 340 u.s. 474, 488 (1951). 
59 East Brookfield, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 52-53, 449 N.E.2d at 676. 
60 Jd. at 53, 449 N.E.2d at 676. 
61 See School Comm. of West Springfield v. Korbut, 373 Mass. 788, 792-93, 449 N.E.2d 
1148, 1151 (1977). 
62 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 51-55, 449 N.E.2d at 676. 
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ers. 63 The School Committee's failure to adopt this fourth option, accord-
ing to the appeals court, justified the Commission's decision and led the 
court to conclude that there "was substantial evidence to show that 
'Nason's discharge was triggered by the filing of a grievance, and could 
have been avoided by the withdrawal of that grievance.' " 64 
The appeals court also rejected the superior court's conclusion that the 
Commission had violated chapter 71, section 38G and exceeded its juris-
diction, committing an error of law, by ordering reinstatement or em-
ployment of Nason as a teacher. 65 The Commission, noted the appeals 
court, had ordered Nason reinstated to her "former position," which had 
been described by the School Committee as an "aide" or "instructor" 
position, and not as a "teaching position. " 66 
Finally, while noting that the Commission's delay in reaching its deci-
sion, approximately two years, might increase the School Committee's 
financial liability to Nason, the appeals court was unwilling to conclude 
that the delay warranted reversal of the Commission's decision. 67 
In sum, the decision of the East Brookfield School Committee to 
discontinue the use of noncertified instructional personnel is an educa-
tional decision which falls within its exclusive managerial prerogative. 68 
The East Brookfield case, however, shows once again that this important 
school committee power cannot be used to shield otherwise unlawful 
conduct. 69 
On a practical level, the East Brookfield case is instructive to school 
committees and practitioners because many "teacher" contracts contain 
recognition clauses that recite that the bargaining unit is comprised of all 
"professional" or "professional instructional" personnel, or similar de-
scriptions. It is not uncommon for school committees to employ tutors, 
aides and others who "instruct" and who may be deemed "professional," 
but who have not been considered part of the teachers' bargaining unit. 
Recognition clauses typically have not restricted coverage to certified 
teachers because of the provision in chapter 71, section 38G which per-
mits school committees to employ uncertified "teachers" where it would 
63 Id. at 53, 449 N.E.2d at 676. 
64 Id. (quoting the Commission). 
65 /d. at 55, 449 N.E.2d at 677. 
66 !d. The appeals court did conclude, however, that the matter of computation of 
"monetary losses suffered by [Nason] from the date of her termination to the date of the 
offer of reinstatement" should be remanded to the Commisssion for a "more definite or 
specific order." !d. 
67 !d. at 56, 449 N.E.2d at 677. 
68 See cases collected in School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm., 388 Mass. 
557, 563-64 & n.4, 447 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 & n.4 (1983). 
69 See Ross & Nuccio, Labor and Employment Law, 1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 7.5, 
at 184. 
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be a hardship to secure certified personnel. 70 Little consideration had 
been given to the possibility that such recognition clauses might sweep in 
ancillary instructional personnel who do not function as teachers. After 
East Brookfield, school committees and teacher associations may want to 
examine their recognition clauses to assess which, if any, instructional 
personnel beyond classroom teachers may be deemed included within the 
bargaining unit. 
§ 9.7. Labor Relations Commission - Authority to Decline Back Pay 
Award in Unlawful Discharge Cases. During the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, in Therrien v. Labor Relations Commission ,t further il-
luminated the rights and obligations of public employees who oppose 
paying agency service fees to a labor organization. 2 In Therrien, the Court 
held that teachers wrongfully discharged when tendering late payment of 
agency fees need not be awarded back pay after failing to follow pre-
scribed procedures. 3 
Steven Therrien and Walter Wasiuk were tenured teachers employed 
by the Leominster School Committee (the "School Committee").4 The 
collective bargaining agreement covering them required nonunion em-
ployees to pay agency service fees to the Leominster Education Associa-
tion (the "Association").5 Consistently, Therrien and Wasiuk, neither of 
whom were Association members, delayed paying their agency service 
fees, protested the amount of such fees and sought pro rata rebates for 
political expenditures pursuant to chapter 150E, section 12.6 
Therrien and Wasiuk failed to pay fees due on November 1, 1980 and, 
pursuant to a request by the Association's president that they be termi-
nated, the Superintendent of Schools notified the teachers that failure to 
70 See supra note 35. 
§ 9.7. 1 390 Mass. 644, 459 N.E.2d 88 (1983). 
2 See School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 431 N.E.2d 
180 (1982) and discussion in Ross & Nuccio, Labor and Employment Law, 1982 ANN. SuRv. 
,MASS. LAW § 4.5, at 172-73. 
3 390 Mass. at 645, 459 N.E.2d at 89. 
4 /d. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. G.L. c. 150E, § 12 provides in pertinent part: 
The commonwealth or any other employer shall require as a condition of employment 
during the life of a collective bargaining agreement so providing, the payment ... of a 
service fee to the employee organization which . . . is duly recognized by the 
employer or designated by the commission as the exclusive bargaining agent for the 
unit in which such employee is employed; provided, however, that such service fee 
shall not be imposed unless the collective bargaining agreement requiring its payment 
as a condition of employment has been formally executed, pursuant to a vote of a 
majority of all employees in such bargaining unit present and voting. Such service fee 
shall be proportionately commensurate with the cost of collective bargaining and 
contract administration. 
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pay the fees by December 1, 1980 would result in their dismissal. 7 When 
the teachers did not pay the fees, the School Committee voted to dismiss 
them at a meeting on February 23, 1981.8 The following day, Therrien and 
Wasiuk tendered payment of the agency service fees to both the treasurer 
and the president of the Association, but these offers were refused.9 The 
dismissal of the teachers became effective at the close of the school day 
on February 24. 10 The Association again rejected tenders by the teachers 
at an emergency executive board meeting that evening. 11 
Two days after their terminations, Therrien and Wasiuk were rehired as 
substitute teachers. 12 Subsequently, they were appointed as probationary 
teachersY As such, they were required to pay agency service feesY 
About one month later, Therrien and Wasiuk were notified that, because 
of Proposition 2 1/2, they were not reappointed for the next school year. 15 
Their employment ended in June, 1981. 16 
Therrien and Wasiuk filed charges with the Labor Relations Commis-
sion (the "Commission") on June 1, 1981, alleging that the School Com-
mittee and the Association had committed prohibited practices in viola-
tion of chapter 150E, sections 10(a)(l) and (3) and 10(b)(1). 17 These 
charges were dismissed. 18 On reconsideration, the Commission decided to 
issue complaints against the School Committee and the Association. 19 
After a hearing, the Commission held that the Association had violated 
chapter 150E, section 10(b)(l), by refusing to accept the tender of agency 
fees prior to the teachers' effective terminations and that the School 
Committee had violated chapter 150E, section 10(a)(l) and (3), by dis-










17 /d. G.L. c. 150E, § lO(a)(l) and (3) provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be a prohibited practice for a public employer or its designated representative 
to: (1) [i)nterfere, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right 
guaranteed under this chapter ... , (3) [d)iscriminate in regard to hiring, tenture, or any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 
employee organization . . . . 
G.L. c. 150E, § lO(b)(l) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be a prohibited practice for an 
employee organization or its designated agent to: (1) [i)nterfere, restrain, or coerce any 
employer or employee in the exercise of any right guaranteed under this chapter . . . . '' 
18 390 Mass. at 646, 459 N.E.2d at 90. 
19 /d. 
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charging the teachers despite their tender. 20 The Commission ordered 
reinstatement, but refused to award back pay. 21 The Commission also 
denied relief under its own regulations. 22 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the teachers' argument 
that denial of back pay infringed upon their constitutional rights and 
violated chapter 150E. The Court declined to consider the constitutional 
issue because at no time during the course of the administrative proceed-
ings had the teachers challenged their terminations on constitutional 
grounds. 23 Turning to the issue of back pay, the Court noted that the 
Commission has discretion under chapter 150E, section 11 to award 
reinstatement, "with or without back pay. " 24 Similar language under the 
National Labor Relations Act, the Court stated, had been construed by 
federal courts as "delegating considerable remedial discretion. " 25 The 
Court concluded fhat it would not disturb the exercise of such discretion 
"unless it is 'arbitrary or capricious' ... or 'a patent attempt to achieve 
ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies' of 
the statute . . . . " 26 Addressing the teachers' argument that the denial of 
back pay is contrary to the policies underlying chapter 150E, the Court 
agreed "that a back pay award is an order designed to vindicate the public 
policy of the statute by making the employees whole for losses suffered on 
account of a prohibited practice.'' 27 Nevertheless, the Court found that a 
denial of back pay in a particular case does not necessarily violate that 
public policy. 28 The Court noted that in School Committee ofGreenfield,29 
the Court, concerned about the proper functioning of an association 
through access to fees, had suggested that "a constitutional method of 
ensuring conformity with the public policy which promotes peaceful and 
efficient labor relations was to escrow the fees pending adjudication. " 30 In 
Therrien however, because of the teachers' repeated delays in paying the 
fees and the time and effort which the Association and the School Com-
mittee were required to expend, the Court concluded that the Commission 
did not violate public policy or abuse its discretion in denying back pay. 31 
20 /d. at 647, 459 N.E.2d at 90. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. See irifra note 33 for text of 402 CMR § 17.05(2) (1981). 
23 390 Mass. at 647-48, 459 N.E.2d at 9(}.91. 
24 /d. at 648, 459 N.E.2d at 91. 
25 /d. (citing Fiberlloard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964)). 
26 390 Mass at 648, 459 N.E.2d at 91 (quoting G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(g) and Virginia Elec. & Power Co. 
v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943)). 
27 /d. at 649, 459 N.E.2d at 91. 
28 /d. 
29 385 Mass. 70, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982); see supra note 2. 
:lO Therrien, 390 Mass. at 649, 459 N.E.2d at 91. 
31 !d. 
29
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According to the Court, the Commission properly considered the compet-
ing interests of the School Committee and the Association. 32 
In addition, the Court sustained the Commission's interpretation of 
chapter 402 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, section 17 .05(2).33 
The Court noted that in City of Chicopee 34 the Commission had held that 
an employee must file a charge of prohibited practice and contemporane-
ously establish an escrow fund to secure the right to continued employ-
ment under section 17.05(2).35 The right to establish an escrow fund, the 
Court noted, arises at the time of the decision to terminate and expires as 
of the effective date of termination " 'so long as this period of time is 
reasonable for purposes of taking the above action.' " 36 The Court found 
that Therrien and Wasiuk had failed to comply with the above require-
ments set forth in the regulation. 37 According to the Court, although the 
regulation did not delineate the procedural requirements for filing charges 
and establishing escrow funds, the Commission's interpretation was 
neither clearly in error nor inconsistent with the terms of the regulation. 
Moreover, the Court stated, the Commission's "interpretation protects 
the interests of the [A]ssociation and the [School] [C]ommittee, and 
simultaneously affords dissenting employees a means by which they can 
'toll' their effective termination pending adjudication.'' 38 
The Commission's remedial order in this case is surprising. Back pay 
almost always accompanies reinstatement of an employee who has been 
unlawfully discharged. Although Therrien and Wasiuk failed to establish 
an escrow fund and file a charge at the time of the decision to terminate 
them, their tender of the agency fees owed "immediately following notice 
of dismissal" should have been sufficient to excuse such failures. Had 
their tender been accepted, there would have been no need for either 
:<!./d. 
33 /d. at 650, 459 N.E.2d at 92. 402 CMR § 17.05(2) (1981) provides: 
An Employee shall have the right to contest the decision to terminate his employment 
by filing a grievance in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement and/or by 
filing appropriate charges before the Commission. During the pendency of the em-
ployee's grievance under the collective bargaining agreement or charge before the 
Commission, the employee shall be permitted to continue his or her employment if 
the employee pays the contested service fee to an escrow fund administered by the 
bargaining agent or offers to make other appropriate arrangements for payment of the 
service fee to the bargaining agent. An employee who refuses to pay the service fee to 
an escrow fund or to make other appropriate arrangements for payment of the service 
fee to the bargaining agent and who is terminated will be denied a back pay award by 
the Commission if the Commission finds the service fee unlawful. 
34 7 M.L.C. 2040 (1981). 
35 Therrien, 390 Mass. at 650, 459 N.E.2d at 92. 
36 /d.(quoting City of Chicopee, 7 M.L.C. 2040, 2046 (1981)). 
37 /d. 
38 /d. at 650-51, 459 N.E.2d at 92. 
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requirement. The Association's unlawful refusal to do so was, in effect, 
condoned by the Court. In light of the Therrien decision, employees who 
desire to contest the payment of full agency fees should do so with great 
care. 
§ 9.8. Interpretation of the Teacher Tenure Statute. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court, during the Survey year, issued two decisions interpreting 
chapter 71, section 41, the teacher tenure statute. Under Massachusetts 
law public school teachers who serve beyond three consecutive school 
years become tenured. Teachers who are serving in their third consecu-
tive school year, and who are given timely notification that they will not 
be reappointed for the following school year, do not receive tenure. 1 
In the first case,Ripley v. School Committee ofNorwood,2 the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered whether a public school teacher who has been 
given timely notification of non-reappointment in her third consecutive 
year of service and who is thereafter terminated, but who is then rehired 
on a full-time basis prior to the beginning of the subsequent school year, 
attains tenure. 3 The Court held that when the Norwood School Commit-
tee (the "School Committee") rehired the teacher, it rehired her with 
tenured status.4 
Stephanie Ripley, a teacher with the Norwood Public Schools, was 
dismissed due to declining enrollment at the end of her third consecutive 
year of service. 5 The School Committee carried out her dismissal in 
accordance with applicable law and the provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement then in effect. 6 Shortly before the next school year 
began, the School Committee asked Ripley to substitute for a teacher on 
pregnancy leave, beginning the first day of the school year. 7 Although she 
herself was due to deliver a child in mid-September, Ripley accepted.8 
Ripley's later request for a pregnancy leave was not acted upon.9 
Nonetheless, when the time came, she left work, delivered a child, and 
returned to teaching after a brief absence. 10 Upon her return, Ripley was 
§ 9.8. 1 G.L. c. 71, § 41 provides in pertinent part, "[e)very school committee, in 
electing a teacher who has served in its public schools for three previous consecutive years, 
shall employ him to serve at its discretion .... " Id. Service at "discretion" has long been 
interpreted to mean service with tenure. See, e.g., Paguette v. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172, 179 
N.E. 588 (1932). 
2 389 Mass. 610, 451 N.E.2d 721 (1983). 
3 Jd. at 611-12, 451 N.E.2d at 722-23. 
4 Jd. at 612, 451 N.E.2d at 723. 







Ross and Nuccio: Chapter 9: Labor and Employment Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
278 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 9.8 
reassigned to the same teaching position she had held at the beginning of 
the school year and up until her absence due to childbirth. 11 A short time 
later, the School Committee voted to appoint Ripley as a regular full-time 
teacher. 12 The following spring, however, Ripley was notified that she had 
not been reappointed to the professional staff for the next school year. 13 
Ripley commenced an action against the School Committee, claiming that 
she was a tenured teacher. 14 
In superior court, Ripley sought a declaration of her tenured status 
under chapter 71, section 41. 15 The School Committee moved for sum-
mary judgment.16 A judgment of dismissal with prejudice was entered 
denying Ripley tenured status, and Ripley appealed. 17 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court transferred the case on its own motion and reversed. 18 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in reaching its decision, relied heavily on a 
plain reading of chapter 71, section 41, and on simple arithmetic. The 
Court stated that, since Ripley had served for three previous consecutive 
school years when she was offered a position as a regular full-time teacher 
in November, she had satisfied the statutory criteria for a tenured em-
ployee.19 
The School Committee had attempted to convince the Court otherwise 
with two arguments. Ripley's original termination in the spring, the 
School Committee argued, had ended her right to be treated as a tenured 
employee.20 The Court was not persuaded, however, distinguishing the 
cases on which the School Committee relied.21 Next, the School Commit-
11 Id. at 611-12, 451 N.E.2d at 722. 
12 Id. at 612, 451 N.E.2d at 722. 
13 Id. at 612, 451 N.E.2d at 722-23. 
14 ld. at 612, 451 N.E.2d at 723. The School Committee agreed to follow the procedures 
accorded a tenured teacher in connection with a dismissal, but did not waive its contention 
that Ripley was not a tenured teacher. Id. 




19 Id. at 613, 451 N.E.2d at 723. 
20 ld. 
21 Id. at 613-15, 451 N.E.2d at 723-24. The School Committee relied on Brough v. 
Governing Bd. of the El Segundo Unified School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 3d 702, 173 Cal. Rptr. 
729 (1981). In Brough, the court rejected a claim that a teacher had acquired tenured status. 
Ripley, 389 Mass. at 614, 452 N.E.2d at 724. The Supreme Judicial Court found the 
reasoning of the Brough court inapposite. Id. The School Committee also relied on Nester v. 
School Comm. of Fall River, 318 Mass. 538, 62 N .E.2d 664 (1945), where the Court had held 
that a teacher's voluntary resignation more than one month before the end of her third 
consecutive school year of employment interrupted the statutory requirement of service, 
even though she was rehired for the subsequent school year. Id. at 541, 62 N.E.2d at 667. 
The Ripley Court was not persuaded that Nester or other like cases where courts considered 
the effect of a voluntary resignation on tenured status compelled a similar result in the 
instant case. 389 Mass. at 615, 451 N.E.2d at 724. 
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tee contended that Ripley's absence from employment near the beginning 
of the school year constituted a break in service sufficient to abrogate any 
tenure claim. 22 The Court, in response to this argument, pointed out that 
Ripley's absence had not resulted in a break in service because, at that 
time, she was not a tenured employee. According to the Court, Ripley 
acquired tenure status when the School Committee voted to hire her as a 
full-time teacher after she had returned from having her child. 23 The 
unambiguous language of chapter 71, section 41 convinced the Court that 
the restrictive interpretation urged by the School Committee was unwar-
ranted.24 
The Court carefully noted several issues that it did not reach in Ripley. 
First, the Court did not decide the legality of "recall" rights, under a 
collective bargaining agreement, which give tenured teachers laid off due 
to budgetary constraints first consideration for openings in the following 
two year period under chapter 71, section 38.25 Section 38 provides that 
no teacher may be elected by a school committee without the prior 
nomination of the superintendent of schools. Second, the Court left open 
for resolution (1) whether the Court's analysis of the tenured status of a 
teacher whose service was terminated, and who then was reemployed, 
would be affected by the nature of, or reasons for, the initial termination, 
that is, whether it was a voluntary resignation, for cause dismissal, or 
dismissal arising solely from declining enrollment or budgetary con-
straints; and (2) whether a tenured teacher who voluntarily terminates in 
one year and who then is rehired, not during the next school year, but 
rather in a subsequent school year, retains tenured status. 26 Finally, the 
Court conceded that it had not reached the issue whether chapter 149, 
section 105D, regarding maternity leave, precludes considering an ab-
sence due to childbirth as a break in service that would defeat a claim of 
tenured status. 27 
In Ripley, the Court ignored the traditional notion of termination in 
favor of a literal reading of the tenure statute, chapter 71, section 41. The 
Court properly rejected an implicit argument that school committees may 
defeat a teacher's right to tenure under section 41 by simply termi!1ating 
the teacher at the end of three years of consecutive service, and then 
rehiring the teacher for the next school year. In Ripley, the hiatus between 
the time the teacher was terminated and the time when the teacher was 
reappointed as a regular, full-time teacher was relatively brief. The Court 
22 389 Mass. at 615, 451 N.E.2d at 724. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. at 616, 451 N.E.2d at 725. 
25 /d. at 613 n.3, 451 N.E.2d at 723 n.3. 
26 /d. at 615 n.5, 451 N.E.2d at 724 n.5. 
27 /d. at 616, 451 N.E.2d at 725. 
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will probably soon be presented with cases where the layoff is longer. The 
question will then be how long an interim is required before statutory 
tenure is cut off. 
Section 41 of chapter 71 states that "[e]very school committee, in 
electing a teacher who has served in its public schools for three previous 
consecutive school years, shall employ him to serve [with tenure]." 28 In 
Ripley, the Court did not directly address the question whether "three 
previous consecutive school years" means any three consecutive years in 
the past or only the three consecutive years directly preceding the em-
ployment of the teacher. The interruption in service in Ripley was less 
than one year. In cases where the hiatus is longer, it is difficult to predict 
whether the Court will find that the teacher was rehired with tenure. The 
Court's seeming literal interpretation of section 41 may compel such a 
conclusion. 
The practical effect of Ripley is that school committees may be discour-
aged from filling regular, full-time vacancies with teachers who either 
have served three previous consecutive years or were tenured prior to 
their termination, knowing that such teachers, once reappointed, may be 
viewed as serving with tenure. Based on the Court's reasoning in Ripley, 
however, teachers hired to serve other than as "regular, full-time" teach-
ers should not be deemed to be tenured. Consequently, hiring a formerly 
tenured teacher to fill a vacancy only during another teacher's pregnancy 
leave should not result in the temporarily appointed teacher acquiring 
tenured status. 
In the second case, School Committee of Grafton v. Grafton Teachers' 
Association, 29 the Supreme Judicial Court applied the reasoning set forth 
in Ripley. The Court was asked, in consolidated cases, to decide if the 
following three issues were arbitrable: (1) whether the School Committee 
violated the collective bargaining agreement when it dismissed, rather 
than laid off, teachers pursuant to a provision of the agreement; (2) 
whether "laid off" status under the agreement, as a matter of contract 
interpretation, and not as a matter of statutory or common law, con-
templates that ·'laid off" teachers who are reemployed during the recall 
period retain tenure; and (3) whether teachers who are dismissed for 
economic reasons are entitled upon recall to tenure because the agree-
ment provides that recalled teachers be given "such salary, seniority and 
fringe benefits" to which they were previously entitled. 30 
The School Committee of Grafton had dismissed eleven tenured teach-
ers for bttdgetary reasons in accordance with applicable law and proce-
28 G.L. c. 71, § 41. 
29 389 Mass. 789, 452 N.E.2d 495 (1983). 
30 Jd. at 791-92, 452 N.E.2d at 496-97. 
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dures. 31 Three of the eleven teachers were reappointed in the next school 
year. 32 The other eight teachers were not. 33 Pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement between the Grafton School Committee and the 
teachers' association, if an opening was available during a specified period 
of time after their termination, teachers "laid off" in a reduction in force 
due to economic reasons were entitled to be recalled at "such salary, 
seniority and fringe benefits as they were entitled to at the effective date 
of their lay off. '' 34 When the School Committee of Grafton had voted to 
dismiss the ele"'en teachers rather than lay them off, the teachers' associa-
tion filed a grievance which was stayed by a superior courtjudge.35 Later, 
when three of the teachers were recalled, the teachers' association again 
filed a grievance seeking arbitration of the status of the recalled teachers, 
and again a superior court judge stayed the grievance proceedings. 36 The 
teachers' association appealed and the cases were consolidated for review 
by the Supreme Judicial Court. 37 
The Supreme Judicial Court found that resolution of the issues raised 
on behalf of the three recalled teachers was likely to be controlled by 
Ripley. 38 The facts in School Committee of Grafton and those in Ripley, 
according to the Court, were indistinguishable.39 The Court concluded 
that application of Ripley would probably require that the three rehired 
teachers be considered to have been recalled with tenured status. The 
case with respect to the other eight teachers, according to the Court, was 
moot for purposes of the statute or the contract, because none of them 
had been recalled during the one year following their dismissals. 40 The 
Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the status of the three 
recalled teachers' cases in light of Ripley. 41 
The Court properly concluded that Ripley controlled the tenure status 
of the three teachers who were reappointed pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement. A literal reading of section 41 of chapter 71 com-
pels the conclusion that tenured teachers who are dismissed, but subse-
quently reappointed to regular, full-time teaching positions before the 
start of the next school year, are reappointed with tenured status. 
The School Committee of Grafton decision has one curious a3pect, 
31 Id. at 790, 452 N.E.2d at 496. 
32 ld. 
33 Id. at 792, 452 N.E.2d at 496. 
34 Id. at 790-91, 452 N.E.2d at 496. 
35 Id. at 789, 452 N.E.2d at 496. 
36 Id. at 790, 452 N.E.2d at 496. 
37 Id. at 791, 452 N.E.2d at 496. 
38 Id. at 792, 452 N.E.2d at 497. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 792, 452 N.E.2d at 497. 
41 ld. 
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however. The Court found that the cases of the teachers who were not 
rehired were moot, whether considered under the contract or the statute, 
presumably section 41. 42 These teachers, who were not recalled, sought a 
declaration that arbitration should resolve the question whether the 
School Committee had violated the collective bargaining agreement when 
it "dismissed" rather than "laid off" the teachers for budgetary consid-
erations. 43 The Court's conclusion that their cases "appear to be moot" 
would therefore be correct only if no new teachers were hired to fill 
openings for which these teachers could have been recalled under the 
collective bargaining agreement. 44 If new teachers had been hired, those 
tenured teachers who were not rehired could claim that denial of "laid 
off" status cost them reapointment. Under such a scenario, these teach-
ers' cases would not be moot if considered under the contract. 
Also, by declaring that the cases of the teachers who were not rehired in 
the next school year were moot, the Court suggested that if these teachers 
were rehired in a subsequent school year, albeit not as a function of the 
collective bargaining agreement, they would be reappointed without te-
nured status. In Ripley, the Court stated that it had left open the question 
whether ''a tenured teacher who terminates his or her service in one year 
and then who is rehired not during the next school year but rather in a 
subsequent school year retains tenured status. " 45 The Court seems to 
suggest a negative answer to this question in School Committee of Graf-
ton. 
§ 9.9. Reduction of Teacher Salaries. Except when there is "a general 
salary revision affecting equally all teachers of the same salary grade in 
the town," chapter 71, section 43 provides that no tenured teacher shall 
have his salary reduced without the teacher's consent. 1 In 1981, the 
Supreme Judicial Court, in Setterlund v. Groton-Dunstable Regional 
School Committee, 2 determined that this statute would not be violated if a 
tenured teacher's salary were reduced in either of two situations: (1) if the 
teacher is subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and the reduction 
is in accordance with the terms of that agreement; and (2) if the teacher, 
although not subject to a collective bargaining agreement, individually 
consents to a salary reduction. 3 In Setterlund, the tenured teacher, 
through his collective bargaining representative, had consented to a salary 




45 Ripley, 389 Mass. at 615 n.5, 451 N.E.2d at 724 n.5. 
§ 9.9. I G.L. c. 71, § 42. 
2 382 Mass. 328, 415 N.E.2d 214 (1981). 
3 Id. at 330 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 216 n.3. 
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in half did not violate chapter 71, section 43.4 The Setterlund Court, 
however, determined that the teacher's involuntary reduction from full-
time to part-time status constituted a dismissal, triggering his right to de 
novo review by the superior court. 5 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court faced a question similar to 
the one addressed in Setterlund. In Lehmann v. Upper Cape Cod Re-
gional Vocational Technical School District Committee ,6 the Appeals 
Court held that the dismissal of Frederick Lehmann, a tenured teacher, 
from his position as a full-time teacher and his subsequent reappointment 
as a part-time teacher at pro rata pay violated chapter 71, section 43. 7 The 
Upper Cape Cod Regional Vocational Technical School District Commit-
tee (the "School District Committee") had voted to phase out an indus-
trial arts program. 8 Lehmann, who taught in that program, was dismissed 
by a vote of the School District Committee from his full-time teaching 
position which paid a salary of $17,423.00 a year. 9 At the same meeting, 
the School District Committee appointed Lehmann to a part-time position 
at a pro rata salary of $11,720.00 for the next school year. 10 At no time did 
Lehmann consent to this reduction in salary Y Lehmann brought a de-
claratory action pursuant to chapter 71, section 43A, seeking a determina-
tion that the School District Committee had violated chapter 71, section 
43.12 A superior court judge held in favor of Lehmann and the School 
District Committee appealed. 13 
On appeal, the Appeals Court found the Lehmann case almost indistin-
guishable from Setterlund. 14 Comparing the facts before it to those in 
Setterlund, the court chastised the School District Committee for putting 
"form over substance." 15 The court analogized the cases to those in 
which courts had seen through formalistic approaches to the resolution of 
tax questions involving so-called "step transactions." 16 The Appeals 
Court concluded that Lehmann's salary reduction, without his consent, 
violated chapter 71, section 43 Y 
4 /d. 
5 /d. at 331, 415 N.E.2d at 216. 
6 17 Mass. App. Ct. 283, 457 N.E.2d 666 (1983). 
7 /d. at 285, 457 N.E.2d at 668. 
8 /d. at 283, 457 N.E.2d at 667. 
9 /d. at 284, 457 N.E.2d at 667. 
10 /d. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. at 283, 457 N.E.2d at 667. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 283, 457 N.E.2d at 667-68. 
15 /d. at 283, 457 N.E.2d at 668. 
16 /d. 
17 /d. at 285, 457 N.E.2d at 668. 
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The Appeals Court misapplied Setterlund in Lehmann. The Setterlund 
Court held only that a teacher is entitled to all procedural protections 
afforded a tenured teacher in connection with dismissal if he is reduced 
from full-time to part-time. The facts recited in Lehmann show that the 
School District Committee followed Setterlund, adhering to the mandated 
procedures in dismissing a tenured teacher. 18 The School District Com-
mittee provided Lehmann with a dismissal hearing and the other required 
procedural protections. After Lehmann was "dismissed," the School 
District Committee rehired him to work on a part-time basis. Once dis-
missed, Lehmann was no longer tenured, and, thus, no longer protected 
by chapter 71, section 43. Under such circumstances, a claim that his 
salary had been reduced without his consent should have failed. Even if 
chapter 71, section 43 had protected Lehmann, his acceptance of the 
part-time position could constitute the consent to salary reduction re-
quired by the statute. In sum, the Appeals Court erred in holding that 
Lehmann was controlled by Setterlund. 
§ 9.10. School Committee's Power to Suspend a Teacher. School commit-
tees may suspend a teacher for misconduct under two different statutes. 
The first, chapter 71, section 42D, provides, inter alia, that a school 
committee may suspend a teacher for "unbecoming conduct" for a period 
of up to one month. 1 The second alternative is chapter 268A, section 25, 
which provides that employees of a county, city, town or district may be 
suspended by the appointing authority during any period such employee is 
under indictment for misconduct in office or employment.2 Chapter 268A, 
section 25 does not specify any limit on the length of time during which a 
teacher may be suspended.3 
During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Appeals Court in Dupree v. 
School Committee of Boston,4 considered whether a suspended teacher, 
who had been indicted for drug-related offenses, had been indicted for 
misconduct "in office or employment" within the meaning of chapter 
268A, section 25.5 The Appeals Court held that, where a public school 
teacher was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the 
18 See id. at 283-84, 457 N.E.2d at 667. 
§ 9.10. I G.L. c. 71, § 420. 
' G.L. c. 268A, § 25 provides in pertinent part: 
An officer or employee of a . . . city . . . may, during any period such officer or 
employee is under indictment for misconduct in such office or employment or for 
misconduct in any election or appointive public office ... , be suspended by the 
appointing authority, whether or not such appointment was subject to approval in any 
manner. ... 
3 See id. 
4 15 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 446 N.E.2d 1099 (1983). 
5 /d. at 536-37, 446 N.E.2d at 1100. 
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school committee could lawfully suspend him from employment under 
chapter 268A, section 25.6 
·The plaintiff was an untenured public school teacher in the Boston 
public schools. 7 Following a late evening arrest outside a Boston bar and 
subsequent search of his apartment where cocaine was seized, the plain-
tiff was indicted for possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance.8 The Boston School Committee (the "School Committee"), 
upon learning of the indictment, suspended the plaintiff from employ-
ment. 9 The School Committee never alleged that the plaintiff had engaged 
in misconduct on school grounds, during work hours, or with school 
personnel or students. 10 The plaintiff sought declaratory relief in superior 
court and was awarded the amount of his withheld salary." On appeal, 
however, the Appeals Court reversed.'2 
Although the Appeals Court acknowledged that an indictment for a 
crime arising from an employee's off-duty conduct is not generally con-
sidered misconduct in office, the court found that certain crimes charged 
are "so inimical to the duties inherent in the employment that an indict-
ment for that crime is for misconduct in office." 13 In support of a broad 
interpretation of the term "in office," the court observed that a police 
officer is almost automatically suspended under a similar statute that 
applies to state employees. 14 The public trust held by a pollee officer, the 
court noted, compares favorably to the public trust held by the school 
teacher. 15 Emphasizing that the teacher is a role model and has particular 
statutory responsibilities for drug education, 16 the court found the School 
Committee entitled to use its discretion in deciding that the plaintiff's 
drug-related indictment was an "indictment for misconduct in office. " 17 
6 !d. at 538, 446 N.E.2d at 1100. 
7 !d. at 535, 446 N.E.2d at 1099. 
8 !d. at 536, 446 N.E.2d at 1100. 
9 !d. at 535, 446 N.E.2d at 1099. The School Committee chose to proceed under G.L. c. 
268A, § 25, rather than under G.L. c. 71, § 42D because the latter statute grants school 
committees the right to suspend teachers for "unbecoming conduct" for a period of only one 
month. Dupree, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 537 n.3, 446 N.E.2d at 1100 n.3. 
10 !d. at 536, 446 N .E.2d at 1100. The court noted that the plaintiff was convicted and was 
in the process of appeal. !d. at 536 n.2, 446 N.E.2d at 1100 n.2. 
11 !d. at 536, 446 N.E.2d at 1100. 
12 !d. 
13 !d. at 537, 446 N.E.2d at 1100. The court cited cases and statutes that had interpreted 
the phrase "in office" fairly broadly. See id. 
14 !d. G.L. c. 30, § 59, is nearly identical to G.L. c. 268A, § 25, except that it applies to 
state employees. 
15 Dupree, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 538, 446 N.E.2d at 1101. 
16 !d. (citing G.L. c. 71, § 1, which specifically requires that "instruction as to the effects 
of ... narcotics on the human system ... be given to all pupils in all schools under public 
control.'') 
17 !d. The court conceded that Tobin v. Sheriff of Suffolk County was helpful to the 
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A contrary holding, the court stated, would compel authorities to move 
for dismissal of the teacher, rather than his suspension, since the only 
other way to suspend him would be for unbecoming conduct under chap-
ter 71, section 42D. 18 In the court's view, its interpretation of chapter 
268A, section 25 was a "sensible supplement" to the provisions of chap-
ter 71, section 42D. 19 Accordingly, the court remanded the case for entry 
of judgment consistent with its holding. 20 
The reasoning in Dupree would seem to apply also to indictments for 
other types of criminal activity deemed contrary to the status of teachers 
as role models for students, but not to alleged criminal conduct less 
serious than that in Dupree. Because of the difficulty justifying the Dupree 
decision with the Supreme Judicial Court's more literal interpretation of 
chapter 268A, section 25, it is uncertain to what extent Dupree will be 
followed. The Appeals Court recognized that, were suspension not avail-
able, the School Committee would have had to choose between dismis-
sing Dupree, which might have been difficult to support upon review, or 
reinstating Dupree and risking a loss of public trust. The Dupree decision 
was therefore a practical one based on particular facts. Consequently, 
should a teacher be under indictment for other than drug-related crimes, 
Dupree may not apply. Dupree may be expanded, however, to allow 
suspensions under chapter 268A upon evidence that the teacher's pres-
ence in the classroom, would undermine the public trust in the school 
system. 
§ 9.11. Right of Housing Authorities to Condition Signing CoUective 
Bargaining Agreements on State Agency Approval. During the Survey year, 
in Springfield Housing Authority v. Labor Relations Commission/ the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court considered whether a housing authority 
could condition the signing of a collective bargaining agreement on an 
agency's approval after the terms of the agreement had been fully 
negotiated. The Springfield Housing Authority (the "Authority") 
negotiated two agreements with the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees, Council93, AFL-CIO (the "Union"). 
The Union ratified both agreements, but the Authority conditioned its 
plaintiff. In Tobin the Supreme Judicial Court suggested that an indictment of a deputy 
sheriff, an officer of the court, which arose from the alleged bribery of the mayor of Revere, 
was not an indictment for misconduct in office under chapter 268A, section 25. Neverthe-
less, citing the special role of teachers in the education of youths, the court distinguished 
Tobin. 
18 Dupree, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 540, 446 N.E.2d at 1102. 
19 !d. 
20 ld. at 541,446 N.E.2d at 1102. The Dupree decision was appealed, but further appellate 
review was denied. 389 Mass. 1103, 451 N.E.2d 1166 (1983). 
§ 9.11. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 454 N.E.2d 507 (1983). 
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ratification on approval by the Massachusetts Department of Community 
Affairs (the "Department"), a division of the Executive Office of Com-
munities and Development ("EOCD") which has supervisory authority 
over local housing authorities. 2 This condition, not agreed to by the 
Union, was imposed because of an EOCD regulation requiring Depart-
ment approval of collective bargaining agreements entered into by a local 
housing authority which cover employees working in projects receiving 
state funding. 3 When submitted for approval, the agreements were re-
jected by the Department for reasons of undue cost. 4 As a result, the 
Authority declined to execute the agreements, although it expressed a 
willingness to bargain further concerning the terms considered unaccept-
able by the Department. 5 
The Union filed charges against the Authority, alleging a violation of 
chapter 150E, section 10(a)(5).6 The Labor Relations Commission (the 
"Commission") found for the Union, concluding that the condition im-
posed by the Authority was invalid because the Union had not agreed to it 
in the course of negotiations. 7 The Commission ordered the Authority to 
execute the agreements and to cease and desist from failing to bargain in 
good faith. 8 The Authority appealed.9 
The Appeals Court found that the long-standing rule announced in H.J. 
Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 10 which states that it is a breach of the duty to 
bargain in good faith for a party to refuse to execute a collective bargain-
ing agreement which has been fully bargained, applies equally to the 
public and private sectors. 11Noting that the Commission has found the 
Heinz policy embodied in chapter 150E, section 10(a)(5), the Appeals 
Court ruled that a public employer may not impose a new condition at the 
end of the bargaining process which could frustrate the agreement. 12 
The Appeals Court then considered whether the EOCD's "prior ap-
proval" regulation, promulgated pursuant to chapter 121B, section 29/3 
2 Id. at 654-55, 454 N.E.2d at 508-09. 
3 Id. at 654-55, 454 N.E.2d at 509. See 760 C.M.R. § 28.00 (preamble 1978). 
4 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 655, 454 N.E.2d at 509. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 653-54, 454 N.E.2d at 508. G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(5) proscribes, as a "prohibited 
practice," the refusal of a public employer to bargain collectively in good faith with the 
exclusive representative of its employees. 
7 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 655, 454 N.E.2d at 508. 
8 Id. at 654, 454 N.E.2d at 508. 
9 Id. 
!0 311 u.s. 514 (1941). 
11 Springfield Housing Authority, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 658, 454 N.E.2d at 510. 
12 ld. 
13 Id. at 659, 454 N.E.2d at 511. G.L. c. 121B, § 29 provides: 
Each housing authority shall keep an accurate account of all its activities and all its 
receipts and expenditures and shall annually in the month of January make a report 
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excused the violation. In addition to giving the Department general super-
vision over local housing authorities, section 29 accords the Department 
rulemaking authority over the standards and principles "governing the 
planning, construction, maintenance and operation of clearance and hous-
ing projects by housing authorities." 14 Section 29 also provides, that 
housing authorities "shall bargain collectively with labor organizations 
representing its employees and may enter into agreements with such 
organizations." 15 In light of the foregoing provisions of section 29, the 
Appeals Court concluded that the " 'prior approval' regulation could 
lawfully apply only to cases where the negotiating parties ... agreed that 
their bargain should be thus conditioned.' ' 16 In this case, where the Union 
had not so agreed, the Appeals Court opined, the regulation exceeded the 
rule making power conferred in section 29, as limited by section 1 0( a)(5). 17 
The Appeals Court noted that its decision does not require EOCD to 
abandon its concern with labor negotiations. The Appeals Court stated: 
EOCD has the capacity to influence policy and action in the labor field 
without going to the impermissible extreme of reserving to itself an after-
the-fact power of veto of completed agreements. It can keep the authorities 
informed of funding realities and other inhibitions on sensible negotiation. 
The regulations, indeed, now require any authority about to engage in labor 
negotiations to meet with the deputy commissioner of the Division of 
Community Development "to discuss matters pertinent to the proposed 
collective bargaining" ... and also to meet with this official for a confer-
ence when the bargaining is "approaching finilization" .... In tum, the 
housing authority can make EOCD's views known to the labor representa-
tive.18 
thereof to the department, to the state auditor and to the mayor of the city or to the 
selectmen of the town within which such authority is organized, such reports to be in 
a form prescribed by the department with the written approval of said auditor. The 
department or said auditor shall investigate the budgets, finances and other affairs of 
housing authorities and their dealings, transactions and relationships. They shall 
severally have the power to examine into the properties and records of housing 
authorities and to prescribe methods of accounting and the rendering of periodical 
reports in relation to clearance and housing projects undertaken by such authorities. 
The department shall from time to time make, amend and repeal rules and regulations 
prescribing standards and stating principles governing the planning, construction, 
maintenance and operation of clearance and housing projects by housing authorities . 
. . . A housing authority shall bargain collectively with labor organizations represent-
ing its employees and may enter into agreements with such organizations. Notwith-
standing any provision of law to the contrary the provisions of sections four, ten and 
eleven of chapter one hundred and fifty E shall apply to said authorities and their 
employees .... 
14 G.L. c. 121B, § 29. See supra note 13 for text of statute. 
15 G.L. c. 121B, § 29. 
16 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 659, 454 N.E.2d at 511. 
17 ld. 
18 Jd. at 660, 454 N.E.2d at 511-12 (quoting 760 C.M.R. § 28.03-.04 (1978)). 
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Finally, the Appeals Court observed that, if EOCD requires "ulti-
mate control," the solution is to seek amendment of the basic legisla-
tion.19 
The decision in Springfield Housing Authority is consistent with tradi-
tional notions of good faith bargaining. The express language of section 29 
reinforces the legislative intent that housing authorities not be required to 
secure "prior approval" of collective bargaining agreements by the De-
partment. Although the decision seems to accord housing authorities 
much greater autonomy in negotiating contracts, the importance of EOCD 
to the success of housing authorities is likely to result in closer communi-
cation between the two entities during the bargaining process than in the 
past. Rather than waiting until the conclusion of negotiations to seek 
EOCD approval, housing authorities will make certain, as bargaining 
progresses, that they stay within the bounds of what EOCD is likely to 
approve. In terms of the collective bargaining process, this is preferable to 
having the parties complete the bargaining process and then find that their 
efforts are to no avail because EOCD has rejected the contract, as oc-
curred in Springfield Housing Authority. Such an outcome inevitably 
damages labor-management relations. 
§ 9.12. Labor Relations Commission- Power to Award Attorney's Fees 
and Expenses. In City of Boston v. Labor Relations Commission/ the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court considered the power of the Labor Rela-
tions Commission (the "Commission") to award attorney's fees and 
expenses. The Commission had determined that the City of Boston and 
the County of Suffolk had committed prohibited practices in violation of 
chapter 150E, section lO(a)(l) and (5). 2 As a result, the Commission had 
ordered the city and county, inter alia, to pay the attorney's fees and 
expenses of the union which were attributable to the investigation, prep-
aration and presentation of the charges before the Commission. 3 The 
superior court affirmed the Commission's decision and also awarded the 
Commission its attorney's fees and expenses in connection with the court 
proceeding. 4 The city and county appealed. 5 
The central issue before the Appeals Court involved the power of the 
Commission to order the payment of attorney's fees and expenses. The 
19 !d. at 661, 454 N.E.2d at 512. 
§ 9.12. 1 15 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 444 N.E.2d 950 (1983).further appellate review denied, 
388 Mass. 1103, 447 N.E.2d 670 (1983). 
2 !d. at 123, 444 N.E.2d at 951. The prohibited practices consisted of unreasonable delays 
in executing negotiated agreements. !d. 
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Commission had relied upon its power to fashion remedies under chapter 
150E, section 11.6 It also had pointed to the power of the National Labor 
Relations Board to order such a remedy7 and to the reliance of state 
appellate courts upon federal cases interpreting the National Labor Rela-
tions Act in construing various provisions of chapter 150E, including 
section 11.8 
The Appeals Court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court in Bour-
newood Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimi-
nation,9 had recently construed similar language under chapter 151B, 
section 510 as not authorizing the Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination ("MCAD") "to assess attorney's fees and expenses in-
curred by an employee who complains to the MCAD of unlawful dis-
crimination."11 According to the Appeals Court, the reasoning in Bour-
newood established that ''if the Legislature had intended to depart from 
the long standing practice of not allowing attorneys fees except in the 
traditional and narrowly circumscribed instances, ... it would have said 
so on the face of [the statute].'' 12 Based on the reasoning in Bournewood, 
the Appeals Court concluded that the Commission was not authorized to 
order that attorney's fees and expenses be paid to the union which had 
filed the charges, and that the superior court was not justified in ordering 
6 Id. at 124, 444 N.E.2d at 952. G.L. c. 150E, § 11 provides: 
If, upon all the testimony, the commission determines that a prohibited practice has 
been committed, it shall state its findings offact and shall issue and cause to be served 
on the party committing the prohibited practice an order requiring it or him to cease 
and desist from such prohibited practice, and shall take such further affirmative 
action as will comply with the provisions of this section, including but not limited to 
the withdrawal of certification of an employee organization established by or assisted 
in its establishment by any such prohibited practice. It shall order the reinstatement 
with or without back pay of an employee discharged or discriminated against in 
violation of the first paragraph of this section. 
7 See City of Boston, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 124-25, 444 N.E.2d at 952. 
8 See id. at 125, 444 N.E.2d at 952. 
• 371 Mass. 303, 358 N.E.2d 235 (1976). 
10 G.L. c. 151B, § 5 provides: 
If, upon all the evidence at the hearing the commission shall find that a respondent has 
engaged in any unlawful practice as defined in [G.L. c. i51B, § 4] ... the commission 
shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such 
respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful 
practice . . . and to take such affirmative action, including but not limited to hiring, 
reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, ... as, in the 
judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this chapter . . . . 
11 City of Boston, 15 Mass. App. Ct. at 125, 444 N.E.2d at 952 (citing Bournewood 
Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm. Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303, 307-13, 358 
N.E.2d 235, 238-41 (1976)). 
12 Id. at 125, 444 N.E.2d at 952. 
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the payment of the Commission's attorney's fees and expenses in connec-
tion with the superior court proceeding. 13 
The National Labor Relations Act, like chapter 150E, does not contain 
any express provision for the awarding of attorney's fees and expenses. 
The power of the National Labor Relations Board to order the payment of 
attorney's fees and expenses has been drawn from the general remedial 
powers of the Board. Nevertheless, despite the fact that federal prece-
dents have carried great weight in the interpretation of chapter 150E, the 
Appeals Court was unwilling to infer from the Commission's general 
remedial powers the ability to award attorney's fees and expenses. 
§ 9.13. Dismissal of Tenured Teachers - De Novo Court Review. 
Under chapter 71, section 43A, any tenured teacher who is dismissed by 
vote of a school committee may appeal the dismissal to the superior court, 
which then hears the case de novo to determine whether the evidence 
supported such action. 1 In the 1981 decision of Spring gate v. School 
Committee of Mattapoisett ,2 the Appeals Court stated that chapter 71, 
section 43A requires the superior court to determine "whether the school 
committee acted on the evidence rather than out of bias, political 
pressure, or other improper matters,"3 by a process of "de novo review" 
in which "findings of fact of the school committee carry no evidentiary 
weight." 4 
During the Survey year, the Appeals Court in Kurlander v. School 
Committee of Williamstown, 5 outlined more specifically the scope of the 
superior court's de novo review. The Appeals Court held that de novo 
review of a school committee's decision to discharge a tenured teacher 
permitted a superior court judge to make an independent determination 
whether any of the charges brought against the teacher had been substan-
tiated.6 
Kurlander, the tenured teacher, argued that the School Committee of 
Williamstown (the "School Committee") had erred in not announcing its 
findings with respect to the specific charges brought against him. 7 The 
13 Jd. at 126, 444 N.E.2d at 952-53. 
§ 9.13. I G.L. c. 71, § 43A. 
2 11 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 415 N.E.2d 888 (1981). See Ross, Labor and Employment Law, 
1981 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw § 7.6, at 185-87. 
3 Springgate, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 305-06, 415 N.E.2d at 889. 
4 /d. at 306, 415 N.E.2d at 889. 
5 16 Mass. App. Ct. 350, 451 N.E.2d 138 (1983),/urther appellate review denied, 390 
Mass. 1103, 454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983). 
6 Id. at 357, 451 N.E.2d at 143. 
7 /d. at 362-66, 451 N.E.2d at 141-44. A unanimous Appeals Court also held that the 
provisions of the open meeting law, G.L. c. 39, § 23B, did not preclude a school committee 
from meeting in closed session for discussion and deliberation of the publicly heard case 
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School Committee had merely announced that it was satisfied that there 
was good cause for Kurlander's dismissal,8 without specifying which, if 
any, of the specific charges against Kurlander had been proven. 9 
In response to Kurlander's appeal from the superior court's decision 
upholding his dismissal, the majority of the Appeals Court found that, 
after Kurlander had submitted the School Committee's decision for de 
novo review, the superior court judge was free to make whatever fact 
findings the record indicated should be made, unconstrained by those 
made by the School Committee. 10 The majority stated that de novo review 
"(1) supplants any fact finding function the school committee may have; 
(2) transfers the function of finding facts to the [s]uperior [c]ourt; and (3) 
requires the [s]uperior [c]ourt, solely on its own view of the evidence 
before it, to make a fresh determination of 'whether the evidence substan-
tiates the charges made by the school committee.' " 11 
In dissent, Judge Warner disagreed with the majority on the issue of 
how broad the scope of de novo review is at the superior court level. 12 
According to Judge Warner, a school committee has a duty to announce 
its decision on the individual charges brought against the teacher and de 
novo review should be confined to consideration of only those charges 
which the school committee announces have been proven. 13 Conse-
quently, Judge Warner would have remanded the case to the School 
Committee for a statement of which charges had been substantiated and 
then to the superior court for de novo review of those charges found 
proven. 14 
The dissent's approach in this case is more persuasive. As Judge 
Warner noted, de novo review focuses on the charges brought against the 
tenured teacher and proven by the school committee, rather than on the 
causes of his dismissal. 15 The majority stated that the superior court judge 
was free to make his own conclusions as to the adequacy of the charges 
against the tenured teacher, in view of the discretion accorded a school committee to do so 
by ajointreadingofG.L. c. 39, § 24andG.L. c. 71, § 42. Kurlander, 16Mass. App. Ct. at 
359-61, 451 N.E.2d at 144-45. 
• 
8 !d. at 354-55, 451 N.E.2d at 141. 
9 /d. at 354, 451 N.E.2d at 141. The School Committee sent Kurlander a letter, making 
fourteen specific charges of causes for his dismissal. !d. at 351, 451 N.E.2d at 140. After the 
hearing, the School Committee voted unanimously that the "charge" of conduct unbecom-
ing a teacher, insubordination and inefficiency had been substantiated. /d. at 352, 451 
N.E.2d at 140. 
10 /d. at 352, 451 N.E.2d at 141-42. 
11 See id. at 355-56, 451 N.E.2d at 142 (quoting Springgate, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 306, 415 
N.E.2d at 889-90). 
12 !d. at 362, 451 N.E.2d at 145 (Warner, J., dissenting). 
13 /d. at 362, 451 N.E.2d at 147 (Warner, J. dissenting). 
14 !d. at 364, 451 N.E.2d at 148 (Warner, J. dissenting). 
15 /d. at 366, 451 N.E.2d at 146-47 (Warner, J. dissenting). 
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for dismissal of Kurlander without regard to which charges had been 
proven to the School Committee. 16 As Judge Warner pointed out, under 
the majority's analysis, the superior court judge could have found that 
Kurlander should have been dismissed for causes which the School 
Committee had not found existed. 17 By electing to have a de novo review 
of the School Committee's decision, Kurlander was therefore placing 
himself in a kind of double jeopardy. While the court may have found the 
School Committee's unstated conclusion on certain charges unsubstan-
tiated, it could have reached its own independent conclusions in support 
of dismissal based on charges found unsubstantiated by the School Com-
mittee.18 Clearly the superior court's de novo review is meant to embrace 
only those charges proven to the satisfaction of the school committee. 
The superior court judge should independently review the evidence sup-
porting those "proven" charges and decide, without any deference to the 
School Committee's finding, whether the evidence in the record substan-
tiated them. 
§ 9.14. Employment Security- Interpretation of Chapter ISlA. Chapter 
151A/ the Massachusetts employment security statute, sets forth, inter 
alia, the standards for determining eligibility for unemployment compen-
sation benefits. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court 
decided four noteworthy cases arising under chapter 151A. 
A. Defining a "Stoppage of Work" 
Section 25 of chapter 151A lists certain circumstances in which unem-
ployed persons are disqualified from receiving unemployment compensa-
tion benefits. 2 Subsection (b) of section 25 disqualifies unemployed per-
sons from receiving benefits for "[a]ny week with respect to which the 
director finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which 
exists because of a labor dispute .... " 3 In 1979, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held, in Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Director of the Division 
16 See id. at 356-59, 451 N.E.2d at 142-43. 
17 Id. at 365, 451 N.E.2d at 147 (Warner, J. dissenting) 
18 Id. 
§ 9.14. 1 G.L. c. 151A, §§ 23-31. 
2 G.L. c. 151A, § 25. 
3 G.L. c. 151A, § 25(b). This general prohibition is subject to two qualifications, or 
exceptions. The first qualification is where an otherwise eligible person "becomes involun-
tarily unemployed during the period of the negotiation of a collective bargaining contract, in 
which case the individual shall receive benefits for the period of his unemployment but in no 
event beyond the date ofthe commencement of a strike orlockout." G.L. c. 151A, § 25. The 
second qualification is where an otherwise eligible person "is not recalled to work within one 
week following the termination of the labor dispute." I d. 
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of Employment Security,4 that the term "stoppage of work," as used in 
section 25(b), refers to the effect upon an employer's operations produced 
by a labor dispute, rather than to the fact that there is a cessation of work 
by employees.5 The Court held in Westinghouse that no "stoppage of 
work" occurs when an employer's main business continues on, unabated, 
during the absence of striking employees.6 The Court left the standard for 
determining whether there has been an abatement of an employer's opera-
tions somewhat flexible, noting that most jurisdictions use a "substantial 
curtailment" test. 7 A stoppage of work ends once an employer's opera-
tions have returned to normal, and otherWise eligible persons are then 
entitled to receive unemployment benefits. 8 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court articulated the 
standard to be used in analyzing whether an employer's operations had 
returned to normal. In Reed National Corp. v. Director of the Division of 
Employment Security, 9 the Court held that "the stoppage of work ends 
when the substantial curtailment [of the employer's operations] no longer 
exists. " 10 According to the Court, whether a substantial curtailment of an 
employer's operations continues is primarily a factual determination to be 
made by the Board of Review of the Division of Employment Security 
(the "Board"). 11 
The case arose when the plaintiff, Reed National Corporation 
("Reed"), challenged the decision of the Board awarding unemployment 
benefits to the claimants beginning at a date some five months after the 
claimants went out on strike following a break down in contract negotia-
tions between Reed and the union representing the employees. 12 The 
Board determined that the strike created a "stoppage of work," finding 
that Reed's operations were substantially curtailed as a result of the 
strike, which was called "because of a labor dispute. " 13 According to the 
Board, this stoppage of work continued until a date five months after the 
strike began. 14 After that date, the Board concluded, the claimants could 
4 378 Mass. 51, 389 N.E:2d 410 (1979). 
5 /d. at 54-55, 389 N.E.2d at 413. 
6 /d. at 56, 389 N.E.2d at 413. 
7 /d. 
8 See General Electric Co. v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 349 Mass. 
350, 364 n.5, 208 N.E.2d 234, 238 n.5 (1%5); Worcester Telegram Publishing Co. v. Director 
of the Div. of Employment Sec., 347 Mass. 505, 508, 198 N.E.2d 892, 897 (1964). 
9 388 Mass. 336, 446 N.E.2d 398 (1983). 
10 Id. at 338, 446 N.E.2d at 399. 
11 /d. at 339, 446 N.E.2d at 400. 
12 /d. at 337, 446 N.E.2d at 399. Reed had a financial interest in having the Board deny the 
claimants' benefits because Reed would be required to contribute to the unemployment 
compensation of the claimants in the event such benefits were awarded. /d. 
13 /d. at 338, 446 N.E.2d at 399. 
14 /d. 
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not be disqualified from receiving benefits. 15 The decision of the Board 
was affirmed by the district court, and Reed appealed. 16 
The Supreme Judicial Court began by addressing Reed's claim that, as a 
matter of law, the employer's operations must return to "normal" or full 
production before striking employees could collect benefits under chapter 
151A, section 25(b). 17 Rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out the 
logical inconsistency that would result from finding that a stoppage of 
work does not begin until production has decreased by 20 to 30 percent, 
and having the stoppage of work end only when production returns to 100 
percent. 18 Consequently, the Court held that, just as a stoppage of work 
begins with a substantial curtailment of the employer's operations, a 
stoppage of work ceases when that substantial curtailment no longer 
remains. 19 
Turning to the question of how substantial curtailment of an employer's 
operations should be measured, the Court first stated that the inquiry is 
primarily one of fact for the Board. 20 The Court then pointed out that its 
definition of "stoppage of work" was intentionally inexact, and was 
designed to be flexible enough to fit a variety of factual settings. 21 Other 
jurisdictions, the Court noted, have found substantial curtailment when 
production drops by 20 to 30 percent. 22 When making a decision, the 
Court stated, the Board "should view the drop in production and de-
creased number of employed production workers, as compared with these 
figures from the previous year, in the context of all the circumstances, 
including the overall status of the corporation's operations." 23 In Reed 
National, the Court stated that the Board had failed to make the findings 
of fact necessary to justify its conclusion that operations had returned to 
normal five months after the strike began, although evidence in the record 
supported such findings. 24 The Court therefore remanded the case for 
further fact finding. 25 
The Reed National decision, setting forth the standard to be applied 
when determining whether a stoppage of work has ceased, was predicta-




18 Id. at 338-39, 446 N.E.2d at 399. 
19 Jd. at 338, 446 N.E.2d at 399. 
20 Jd. at 339, 446 N.E.2d at 400. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Jd. at 340, 446 N.E.2d at 400. 
24 ld. 
25 Jd. at 341, 446 N.E. 2d at 401. The Court remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions for the case to be remanded to the Board for fact finding. Id. 
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menced when a significant percent of an employer's operations have been 
curtailed. It was therefore logical for the Court to hold that, when the 
employer's percentage of production reaches a point above the stoppage 
of work level, the stoppage is over, even though production has not 
returned to 100 percent. If the labor dispute continues after production 
has risen above the stoppage of work level, then otherwise eligible per-
sons should be entitled to receive unemployment compensation. 
The Reed National decision affords the Board considerable discretion 
to decide whether a substantial curtailment of an employer's operations 
has ceased. As a practical matter, if the Board makes findings of fact along 
the lines suggested by the Court, its conclusions will be sustained on 
appeal. 
The ability of employees to obtain unemployment compensation be-
nefits during a strike is a significant factor in determining how long a strike 
will last. The Reed National decision is helpful because it sets forth the 
standard for determining whether a stoppage of work has ceased, and 
when otherwise eligible employees out of work in the midst of a labor 
dispute will be able to receive unemployment benefits. 
B. Defining "Total or Partial Unemployment" 
The Massachusetts employment security law requires, inter alia, that a 
person be in "total or partial unemployment" in order to be eligible for 
benefits. 26 A person is "deemed to be in total unemployment in any week 
in which he performs no wage-earning services whatever, and for which 
he receives no remuneration, and in which, though capable of and avail-
able for work, he is unable to obtain any suitable work. " 27 "Remunera-
tion," for purposes of defining total unemployment, "shall be deemed to 
have been received in such week or weeks in which it was earned or for 
such week or weeks . . . to which it can reasonably be considered to 
apply." 28 During the Survey year, in South Hadley v. Director of the 
Division of Employment Security, 29 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a 
school teacher who was e.~ployed under a collective bargaining agree-
ment which extended through the summer, and who was given a notice of 
dismissal at the close of the school year, does not receive "remuneration" 
for the following summer months and, thus, if otherwise eligible, can 
receive unemployment compensation benefits during those months. 30 
In the spring of 1981, the South Hadley School Committee (the 
"School Committee") notified Lynn Fitzgerald, a tenured teacher, that 
26 See G.L. c. 151A, § 24(c) and G.L. c. 151A, § l(r). 
27 G.L. c. 151A, § l(r)(2). 
28 G.L. c. 151A, § l(r)(3). 
29 389 Mass. 399, 450 N.E.2d 596 (1983). 
30 /d. at 401-02, 450 N.E.2d at 597. 
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she would be laid off effective the following fall because of a reduction in 
the town's budget.31 A district court judge affirmed the decision of the 
Division of Employment Security (the "Division") that Fitzgerald was 
entitled to unemployment benefits, if she was otherwise eligible, from the 
date she had last worked at the end of the school year. 32 The Town of 
South Hadley appealed, arguing that Fitzgerald was ineligible to receive 
benefits for the summer months because the term of her employment 
extended through the summer under the collective bargaining agreement, 
because she was on vacation during the summer, and because she could 
have received insurance coverage through the summer and had her salary 
paid to her over twenty-six biweekly installments.33 The Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the town's arguments, finding that Fitzgerald was not 
ineligible to receive unemployment compensation during the summer 
months following receipt of the School Committee's notice of her dismis-
sal. 34 
The Court began its analysis by reviewing certain details of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. According to the Court, while the agreement 
ran through the summer, it called for the school year to end by June 30. 35 
Next, the Court found that Fitzgerald's last day of employment was June 
23, and that subsequently she had no obligation to work for the town. 36 
The Division hearing officer, the Court noted, had concluded Fitzgerald 
was in "total unemployment" as defined by chapter 151A, section l(r)(2) 
as of June 23, and was therefore entitled to receive benefits from that date 
forward, if otherwise eligible. 37 
Reviewing the hearing officer's decision, the Court first looked to 
chapter 151A, section l(r), for a definition of "total unemployment. " 38 In 
determining whether Fitzgerald was in total unemployment as of June 23, 
the Court focused on the meaning of the word "remuneration" as defined 
in chapter 151A, section l(r)(3). 39 The Court found that since Fitzgerald 
had performed no wage-earning services during the summer period, the 
question was whether, in the broader sense, she had received any "re-
muneration" over the summer. 40 In analyzing this issue, the Court first 
31 /d. at 399, 450 N.E.2d at 597. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. at 400, 450 N.E.2d at 597. 
34 /d. The Supreme Judicial Court sustained the decision of the district court and the 
Division of Employment Security. !d. 




38 !d. at 401, 450 N.E.2d at 597. 
39 Jd. at 401, 450 N.E.2d at 598. 
40 /d. 
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pointed out that Fitzgerald had received no "compensation" for that 
period, "[b]ecause under [chapter] 71, [section] 40, a public day school 
teacher's compensation is treated as earned during the time when school 
is in session." 41 Assuming that the meaning of the term "remuneration" 
when defined as "any consideration" was broader than the term "com-
pensation," the Court then considered whether Fitzgerald had received 
any remuneration whatsoever over the summer. 42 The test, according to 
the Court, "is not in what week the remuneration is received but in what 
week it is earned or to which it may reasonably be considered to apply.'' 43 
The Court found it impossible to conclude that the remuneration paid 
school teachers during the summer, in the form of compensation or 
benefits, applied to any time other than the school year. 44 Concluding that 
Fitzgerald had received no remuneration during the summer, the Court 
found that the teacher was not ineligible for benefits during the summer 
months following receipt of the notice of dismissal. 45 
The Court found support for its decision in chapter 151A, section 
28A(a), which provides that a teacher who works in one school year, and 
has a "reasonable assurance" of working in the following school year, is 
not entitled to unemployment compensation during the intervening sum-
mer months. 46 The Court inferred that the Legislature intended that those 
teachers who had no reasonable assurance of returning the following 
school year would, if otherwise eligible, be entitled to unemployment 
compensation.47 While, theoretically, Fitzgerald could have been re-
called, in the Court's view she had no reasonable assurance ofreturning.48 
If the Legislature had intended to deprive teachers, such as Fitzgerald, of 
unemployment compensation during the summer, according to the Court, 
it could have stated so in chapter 151A, section 28A(g).49 
In a final footnote, the Court noted that the town believed that this 
result was unfair because the town frequently must send layoff notices in 
the spring to protect itself against the possibility of insufficient appropria-
tions.50 According to the town, many teachers who receive notice in the 
spring are, in fact, rehired when sufficient appropriations are subse-
41 ld. G.L. c. 71, § 40 states: "[t]he compensation paid to [public day school] teachers 
shall be deemed to be fully earned at the end of the school year, and proportionately earned 
during the school year." /d. 
42 South Hadley, 389 Mass. at 401, 450 N.E.2d at 598. 






49 Id. at 402-03, 450 N.E.2d at 598. 
50 Id. at 403 n.6, 450 N.E.2d at 598-99 n.6. 
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quently made.s' The Court stated that the town should take such an 
argument to the Legislature because the statutes at issue dictated the 
result in the instant case. 52 
The practical effect of South Hadley is that, where budgetary consid-
erations force a school committee to send dismissal notices to teachers in 
the spring to avoid a contractual obligation to have them return in the fall, 
those teachers will be able to collect benefits during the summer. If these 
teachers do collect benefits over the summer, the towns and cities will, 
depending upon the method of contribution, either directly or indirectly, 
be forced to pay for these benefits. This result will further burden munici-
pal budgets that are already strained. 
The South Hadley decision will, perhaps, have a more significant prac-
tical impact on the strategies employed by school committees negotiating 
teacher contracts. At present, many teacher contracts contain provisions 
that require notice of layoff or dismissal be sent before the end of the 
school year in order for them to be effective as of the beginning of the next 
school year. Prior to South Hadley, school committees had little financial 
incentive to oppose sending spring notices. As was the case in South 
Hadley, such notices are routinely sent out to many teachers due to 
budgetary uncertainties. When the budget is finalized, many, if not all, of 
the teachers who received such notices are, in fact, reappointed to teach-
ing positions for the next school year. South Hadley provides for school 
committees to seek the right to send dismissal or layoff notices only after 
the budget has been finalized for the next fiscal year. Clearly a school 
committee would benefit by having to send notices only to those teachers 
who it was reasonably certain would not be employed. School committees 
which are required to send spring notices are likely to take the steps 
necessary to shorten the period of time between the sending of dismissal 
notices and the reemployment of laid off teachers which follows finaliza-
tion of the budget. 
C. Interpreting the Concept of "Involuntary Resignation" 
Chapter 151A, section 25(e)(l) provides that a person is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits if he has left work "voluntarily without good 
cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent.' '53 A person shall not 
be disqualified from receiving benefits under this provision, however, if he 
can establish "that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, 
compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involun-
tary."54 During the Survey year, in Manias v. Director of the Division of 
51 ld. 
52 ld. 
53 G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(l). 
54 ld. 
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Employment Security, 55 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a 
review examiner's failure to make findings on a claimant's contentions 
that she had good cause to leave her employment was an error in law. 56 
The claimant Angeliki Manias had argued that both her employer's reduc-
tion in her work hours, which substantially reduced her accustomed 
wages, and her child care demands constituted urgent and compelling 
reasons for her to leave her position, thus rendering her resignation 
"involuntary" for purposes of section 25(e)(1)_57 
A restaurant had employed Manias as a laundry worker. 58 Although for 
a period of time her work schedule included a great deal of overtime, her 
schedule was changed so as to eliminate the extra hours. 59 When asked to 
work evening hours, she objected, claiming that evening hours would 
interfere with her family and homemaking obligations. 5° She requested a 
change in her schedule and resigned when it was denied.61 The review 
examiner from the Division of Employment Security (the "Division") 
denied Manias unemployment benefits, finding that her leaving was volun-
tary and without good cause attributable to her employer.62 She appealed 
to the Boston Municipal Court, which affirmed the decision of the review 
examiner.63 The case was thereupon appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court pursuant to chapter 151A, section 42. 64 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that, if the review examiner's findings 
supported the claimant's contentions that her employer's reduction in her 
work hours and overtime resulted in a substantial reduction in her wages, 
then such facts would constitute good cause attributable to the employer 
for purposes of chapter 151A, section 25(e), making her eligible to receive 
unemployment benefits. 65 In addition, the Court held that a finding could 
be made that the claimant's child care and family obligations were so 
compelling as to render her resignation involuntary. 66 
Addressing the claimant's first argument, the Court found that, where 
the basis of employment includes the guarantee of overtime, an employee 
can resign for good cause when the employer takes that overtime away. 67 
55 388 Mass. 201, 445 N.E.2d 1068 (1983). 
56 Id. at 206, 445 N.E.2d at 1071. 
57 !d. at 202, 445 N.E.2d at 1068. 
58 ld. 
59 ld. 




64 Id. at 202, 445 N.E.2d at 1068. 
65 Id. at 203, 445 N.E.2d at 1069. 
66 Id. at 205, 445 N.E.2d at 1070. 
67 ld. at 202, 445 N.E.2d at 1069. Moreover, the Court reasoned that a sharp reduction in 
wages may be viewed as good cause for leaving employment. !d. at 203, 445 N.E.2d at 1069 
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Moreover, the Court determined that a substantial reduction in wages 
may render a job unsuitable and be viewed as good cause for leaving 
employment. 68 The Court pointed out that it would be absurd for an 
employer to be able to drastically reduce an employee's wages, forcing his 
resignation, and at the same time prevent him from collecting unemploy-
ment benefits.69 The Court stated that, for Manias to prevail on remand, 
she would have to establish that the reduction in her hours, including 
accustomed overtime, resulted in a substantial wage reduction. 70 Accord-
ing to the Court, the fact finder could either make this determination on 
the already assembled evidence, or reopen the record to receive further 
evidence. 71 
The claimant's second argument was that her resignation was involun-
tary because her new hours did not permit her to meet her child care and 
domestic responsibilities. 72 The Court reasoned that "[s]ince domestic 
responsibilities can entitle a claimant to reject certain employment situa-
tions as unacceptable and restrict her work availability under [section] 
24(b), ... those same responsibilities also may constitute urgent and 
compelling reasons which make a resignation involuntary under . . . 
[section] 25(e)(l). " 73 Although substantial evidence was already in the 
record, the Court remanded the case, stating that the Division should 
decide such fact issues. 74 
The Manias decision reinforces the obligation of the Division of Em-
ployment Security to establish the factual bases for its determinations. In 
this case, the Division failed to make findings of fact, incorrectly assuming 
that the claimant's reasons for resignation could not, as a matter of law, 
constitute either "good cause" or "compelling" reasons. In rejecting the 
Division's assumption, the Court opened the door to claimants to argue a 
(citing Graves v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 




71 /d. at 204, 445 N.E.2d at 1070-71. 
72 /d. at 204-05, 445 N.E.2d at 1069-70. 
73 /d. at 204, 445 N .E.2d at 1070. In Conlan v. Director of the Division of Employment 
Security, 382 Mass. 19,413 N.E.2d 727 (1980), the Court held that the board of review of the 
Division had erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, a claimant failed to meet the availability 
requirements of G.L. c. 151A, § 24(b) because she was unwilling to work all shifts other than 
the day shift due to personal domestic responsibilities, and in failing to consider whether the 
claimant had good cause within the meaning of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(c) to decline suitable 
employment. Conlan, 382 Mass. at 25, 413 N.E.2d at 731. In Conlan, the Court pointed out, 
however, that a claimant cannot restrict his availability so drastically as to effectively 
remove himself from the work force and still obtain unemployment compensation benefits. 
/d. 
74 Manias, 388 Mass. at 205-06, 445 N.E.2d at 1070-71. 
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right to benefits if they leave work because their salary is reduced or 
domestic responsibilities require them to stay at home. The Manias deci-
sion should not be interpreted, however, as supporting the proposition 
that employees who leave work because of serious domestic require-
ments, if otherwise eligible, are entitled to receive unemployment be-
nefits. For benefits to be awarded, there must be a change in the terms of 
employment. Although the Court was not clear on this point, in Manias 
the claimant will probably not succeed if the fact finder, on remand, 
concludes that the terms of her employment had not changed. The claim-
ant should be entitled to receive benefits only if a change in the terms of 
her employment have made already existing domestic responsibilities 
impossible to meet. 
D. Defining "Suitable Employment" 
Under chapter 151A, section 25, no benefits may be paid to a person 
who fails to accept "suitable employment" without good cause when 
offered to him. 75 According to the statute, the suitability of a position 
depends on whether the employment is "detrimental to the health, safety 
or morals of an employee, is one for which he is reasonably fitted by 
training and experience ... , is located within [a] reasonable distance ... 
and ... does not involve travel expenses substantially greater than [did] . 
. . his former work. " 76 The statute expressly makes certain work unsuita-
ble, dictating that "benefits shall not be denied . . . to any otherwise 
eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the 
[unsuitable] conditions. " 77 
During the Survey year, in Gillig v. Director of the Division of Employ-
75 G.L. c. 151A, § 25(c). 
76 See id. 
77 Id. G.L. c. 151A, § 25(c) reads in pertinent part: 
No work shall be deemed suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter 
to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the 
following conditions: -
(1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or other labor 
dispute; 
(2) If the remuneration, hours or other conditions of the work offered are substan-
tially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the 
locality; 
(3) If acceptance of such work would require the individual to join a company union 
or would abridge or limit his right to join or retain membership in any bona fide labor 
organization or association of workmen. 
An individual who is certified as attending an industrial retraining course or other 
vocational training course as provided under section thirty shall not be denied 
benefits by reason of the application of the first paragraph of this subsection relating 
to failure to apply for, or refusal to accept, suitable work. 
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ment Security ,18 the Supreme Judicial Court addressed for the first time 
the significance of the "new work" language in section 25, and denied 
unemployment compensation to a claimant who had refused, in essence, 
to continue in old work under conditions declared unsuitable for new 
work in the statute. The claimant was employed as a restaurant manage-
ment trainee at $200 per week, based on 50 hours of work, from December 
1979 to February 1980.79 One of the conditions of her employment was 
that she be available "at all times for all shifts."80 Although the claimant 
made known her unhappiness about working the early shift, she neverthe-
less did so from time to time.81 Early in 1980, the employer closed one of 
its restaurants. 82 At this time, the employer reduced the size of its man-
agement staff and wanted to insure that all trainees continuing in employ-
ment would be available to work all shifts. 83 The claimant was terminated 
because she expressed her reluctance to work the early shift. 84 
After a hearing, the director of the Division of Employment Security 
(the "Division") found that the claimant had left work voluntarily, with-
out compelling reasons or "good cause attributable to the employing 
unit," and was therefore not entitled to benefits.85 The Board of Review 
(the "Board") of the Division found that if the claimant had been willing 
to work the early shift, she could have continued in employment. 86 Re-
versing the decision of the hearing officer, however, the Board found that 
the early shift was ''unsuitable'' employment within the meaning of chap-
ter 151A, section 25(c)(4) and that the 87 claimant was entitled to unem-
ployment benefits.88 The district court affirmed the decision, and the case 
was appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.89 
The Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment 
78 389 Mass. 483, 450 N.E.2d 622 (1983). 
79 /d. at 483-84, 450 N.E.2d at 623. 
80 /d. at 484, 450 N.E.2d at 623. 
81 /d. 
82 /d. 




87 /d. Subsection (c)(4) provides that: 
No work shall be deemed suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter 
to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the 
following conditions: ... (4) If in the case of a female the acceptance of such work 
would require her to work between the hours of twelve midnight and six o'clock ante 
meridian. 
G.L. c. 151A, § 25(c)(4), was repealed by Acts of 1980, c. 131, § 10, but had not been 
repealed at the time this claim was originally filed. 
88 Gillig, 389 Mass. at 484, 450 N.E.2d at 624. 
89 /d. at 484, 450 N.E.2d at 623. 
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denying benefits.90 The Court began by pointing out that the claimant had 
not rejected new work in declining to work the early shift.91 The claimant, 
the Court noted, had worked the early shift in the past and she was 
required, as a condition of employment, to be available to work that 
shift.92 Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the Board had 
erred as a matter of law in determining that section 25(c)(4) applied. 93 The 
Court reasoned that the Legislature had intended to give meaning to the 
word "new" and that the word was not surplusage in the statute.94 
According to the Court, statutes in other states, and case law in the 
federal courts and other state courts, supported its decision.95 The Court, 
however, was careful to acknowledge that the claimant could have had 
"good cause" to leave work within the meaning of chapter 151A, section 
25(e)(l), and thus, not be ineligible for benefits, but that such "good 
cause" had not been raised in the hearing.96 
The Gillig decision may reflect the Court's desire to avoid addressing a 
constitutional question involving gender-based discrimination, especially 
since the statutory provision at issue had already been repealed. 97 The 
Court left open the question whether the reasons the positions listed in 
section 25(c) were unsuitable employment in the first place also estab-
lished "good cause" for leaving a job. In Gillig, the Court could have 
ruled as a matter oflaw that it was "good cause" for the claimant to leave 
a job that would have been unsuitable if she had been requested to take it 
as new work. This, however, would have required the Court to reach the 
constitutional issue which it avoided. The Court did suggest that, if a 
claimant works in a job that is deemed "unsuitable" new work, the nature 
of the work may constitute good cause for leaving. In future cases before 
the Divisiop, claimants are therefore likely to use the "unsuitable" cate-
gories listed in section 25(c) as some evidence of "good cause" for 
resigning. 




94 /d. at 486, 450 N.E.2d at 625. 
95 See id. at 486-87, 450 N.E.2d at 625. 
96 /d. at 487, 450 N.E.2d at 625. 
97 See supra note 87. The employer claimed that the statute was unconstitutional on the 
basis of gender-based discrimination, but the Court sidestepped this argument. See Gillig, 
389 Mass. at 485, 450 N.E.2d at 624. 
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